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분류없음2010.05.06 14:25
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대북 정보당국은 북한 대남공작 총괄기구인 '정찰총국'이 천안함 침몰을 주도했음을 뒷받침하는 정황 증거를 3개가량 확보, 천안함 침몰이 북한 소행이라는 결론을 내린 것으로 6일 알려졌다. 정보당국은 천안함 사건 초기부터 '북한의 소행이라면 그 주체는 정찰총국일 것'이라는 판단을 바탕으로 광범위한 정보를 수집한 결과 천안함 사건을 담당한 곳이 '정찰총국의 ○국○처'라는 사실까지 확인한 것으로 전해졌다.

원본출처 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/07/2010050700166.html?Dep1=news&Dep2=top&Dep3=top

정찰총국은 지난해 2월 노동당 산하 작전부(간첩 침투)와 35호실(해외 공작부서) 등이 인민무력부 산하 정찰국과 통폐합하면서 만들어진 대남 공작의 총본부이다.

정부 당국자는 "정찰총국 산하에는 기존 정찰국 외에 작전국(당 작전부), 대외정보국(당 35호실) 등 몇개 국(局)이 있다"며 "천안함 사건은 정찰국과 작전국이 태스크포스(TF)를 만들어 저지른 것으로 본다"고 말했다. 과거 군 정찰국은 청와대 습격사건(1968년)과 미얀마 아웅산 테러 사건(1983년) 등을 일으켰다.

당 작전부(정찰총국 작전국)는 현재 대남 공작을 총괄하는 오극렬 국방위 부위원장이 20년 동안 이끌었던 부서로, 간첩의 해상·육상 침투를 전담한다.

정부 소식통은 이날 "그동안 북한의 개입 가능성에 대해 한·미 정보당국이 각종 정보와 첩보들을 역추적해 정황 증거들을 수집해왔다"며 지금까지 3개가량의 결정적인 정황증거를 확보했다"고 전했다. 정보당국은 미 정찰위성과 U-2 정찰기, 한국군의 금강·백두 정찰기, 통신감청 기지 등을 통해 수집한 정보와 인간정보 등을 종합해 이 같은 사실을 파악했다.

정보당국은 이와 함께 천안함 공격에 동원됐을 것으로 추정되는 소형 잠수함 또는 잠수정의 움직임도 구체적으로 확인한 것으로 전해졌다. 정보 당국은 이런 판단을 민·군 합동조사단의 종합 조사 결과가 나오는 오는 20일 이후 적절한 경로를 통해 밝힌다는 계획이다.

한편 합동조사단은 인양된 천안함 연돌(연통)에서 화약 흔적을 확인했으며 선체 내에서 발견된 알루미늄 파편이 어뢰의 일부일 가능성이 크다고 보고 정밀조사를 벌이고 있다.
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북한의 스텔스 어뢰정 SES :플레인맨 '북한 스텔스 기술 이미 보유'

http://planeman-bluffersguide.blogspot.com/2009/12/bluffers-guide-north-korean-naval-power.html


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플레인맨 블로그에는 북한을 비롯한 러시아 중국등 세계 여러나라의 군사기지 위치를 표시한 구글지도파일이 올려져 있습니다
플레인맨 블로그 http://planeman-bluffersguide.blogspot.com/ 해당글에서 자세히 찾아보면 구글지도파일을 다운로드 받을 수 있습니다
여기에서는 편의를 위해 플레인맨이 직접 만든 북한군사기지지도 구글 파일을 올려놓았습니다
다운로드 받은 뒤 구글어스를 연다음 구글어스로 불러오면 됩니다

기타국가 파일에 관심있으신 분들은 블로그에서 해당글을 찾아 다운로드 받으시기 바랍니다

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천안함 침몰로 북한 군사력에 관심이 집중되고 있는 가운데 국적불명의 한 아마츄어 리서처가 북한의 군사정보를 자신의 
블로그에 속속들이 공개해 화제가 되고 있습니다, 

PLANEMAN 이라는 필명의 이 블로거는 자신을 아마츄어 리서처라고 소개했지만 공개내용은 가히 충격적입니다
이 블로그에는 '북한의 군장성이 보면 기절할 것' '정보기관에서 연락이 갈 것 같다'는 등의 댓글이 달려 엄청난 폭발력이 담긴
컨텐츠임을 실감케 하고 있습니다

2012/09/16 - [분류 전체보기] - 안치용,‘박정희 대미로비 X파일’출판 : 미국의 청와대도청은 실재- 박정희 방탄차 알고보니 CIA가 제공

PLANEMAN 이 운영하는 블로그는 '플레인맨 블러퍼스 가이드' http://planeman-bluffersguide.blogspot.com/ 입니다 
또 http://www.militaryphotos.net 에도 러시아, 중국, 파키스탄, 인도등 세계 각국의 군사정보를 올리는가 하면
여러 곳의 군사사이트 포럼에서 활발한 활동을 하고 있고 천안함 관련 포럼에도 의견을 개진하고 있습니다 

PLANEMAN의 글중 일단 우리의 가장 큰 관심사인 북한의 군사력을 해군전력1,2, 요새화된 북한1,2순으로 소개해 보겠습니다 

플레인맨은 일단 블로그스팟에 블로그를 개설하기 이전인 지난 2007년 6월 5일 밀리터리포토 사이트에 '2007 북한의 해군전력'
[http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?113552-Bluffers-guide-North-Korean-Naval-Power-2007 ] 이란
글을 통해 북한의 해군전력을 '잠수함부대'등 5개 주제에 맞춰 정리했습니다 


플레인맨은 북한의 해군전력 1탄에 이어 지난해 12월 5일 자신의 블로그인 플레인맨 블러퍼스 가이드에 해군력에 대한 최신내용을 업그레이드한 '북한의 해군전력 2' [ http://planeman-bluffersguide.blogspot.com/2009/12/bluffers-guide-north-korean-naval-power.html ]을 올렸습니다 

플레인맨이 올린 글을 보면 북한의 전체적인 해군력은 물론 이번에 천안함 침몰사태로 언론에 언급된 북한의 잠수함부대에 대한 자세한 내용을 볼 수 있습니다 남포아래의 비파곶 잠수함기지를 포함해 각 해군기지의 위성사진은 물론 각 부두에 정박된
잠수함을 로메오급 상어급 위스키 급으로 표시했습니다 심지어 북한이 이란에 수출한 TIR급 쾌속어뢰정이 이란에 정박돼 있는 위성사진도 찾아내 싣고 있습니다 또 대동급 반잠수정, 유고급 반잠수정등 각 해군장비의 스펙에 대해서도 자세히 소개돼 있습니다 특히 일부 함정은 플레인맨자신이 각 정보를 취합해 직접 드로잉했다고 합니다 

입이 쩍 벌어질 수 밖에 없는 내용들입니다 


플레인맨은 요새화된 북한에 대해서도 자세히 소개했습니다 특히 평양을 중심으로 구성돼 있는 백여개의 대공포기지와 함께 기지에 배치된 대공포를 분석, 사정거리를 계산해 참새 한마리 통과할 수 없을 정도로 촘촘한 평양 방공망을 그래픽으로 설명했습니다 

플레인맨이 요새화된 북한 1을 발표한 시기는 2008년 2월 9일 자신의 블로그[http://planeman-bluffersguide.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2008-01-01T00%3A00%3A00-08%3A00&updated-max=2009-01-01T00%3A00%3A00-08%3A00&max-results=1]를 통해서 였습니다 



2009년 8월 2일에는 밀러터리포토 사이트에 '북한기습 2009' [원제는 NORTH KOREA STRIKES 2009이며 번역을 둘러싼 논란을 피하기 위해 '노스코리아 스트라이크 2009'로 표현하겠습니다][ http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?162240-Bluffer-s-Guide-North-Korea-strikes!-(2009) ] 라는 제목으로 개정판을 올렸습니다 

'요새화된 북한'에서는  1. 정교한 평양일대의 방공망 2. 지하 공군기지 3. 방공포 내역 4. 터널에 숨겨진 장거리포등 4가지 주제의 글을 통해 북한에 지하기지가 많고 방공망을 정교하게 구성, 사실상 요새화됐음을 입증했습니다

특히 구글 위성사진으로 요새화된 북한의 군기지를 찾아내 어떤 무기들이 어디에 어떻게 배치돼 있는지를 자세한 설명과 함께
게재했고 일부 지하시설에 숨겨진 무기의 경우 자신이 직접 무기가 어떻게 숨겨져 있을 것인지를 폭넓은 군사지식을 통해
직접 시각화했습니다 

'노스코리아 스트라이크 2009'는 그야말로 플레인맨 군사지식의 결정판이라 불러도 손색이 없습니다 
수십장의 위성사진을 동원, 북한의 군사기지와 방공포 위치를 낱낱이 찾아냈습니다 구글을 통해서만 4백개의 포진지를 찾을 수 있었다고 합니다
또 1,2,3,4 호 땅굴의 위치는 물론 휴전선 155마일을 따라 구성된 1,2차 탱크저지선[DITCH]등을 지도와 실물 사진으로 소개했고 서울에 포사격이 가능한 사거리를 지도로 표현했습니다

서울북방 비무장지대 서부전선에 배치된 방공포 사이트도 사거리와 함께 소개했고 수도 서울 상공을 중심으로 구성된 방공망도 그래픽으로 표시했습니다 또 서울에 핵폭탄이 터질 경우의 피해상황도 예측했습니다 


특히 '노스코리아 스트라이크 2009'에는 북한 공군기지에 대해서도 소개함으로써 그야말로 북한의 육해공군 전력을 모두 분석해 내는 기염을 토했습니다 또 서두에 북한 군의 장점과 약점을 일목요연하게 정리하는 것도 잊지 않았습니다

플레인맨 블로그에 올려진 글들은 현재 모두 16건으로 러시아와 중국, 이란, 인도, 파키스탄, 베트남, 대만, 북한등의 군사력을 낱낱이 발가벗겼고 가장 최근에는 지난달 10일 '요새화된 러시아 1탄'이란 제목하에 러시아의 방공망을 분석했습니다 



플레인맨은 특히 구글어스를 이용해 북한과 중국 러시아등 자신이 조사한 모든 국가의 군사기지 현황을 지도에 표시, 파일로 제작해 서비스함으로써 누구나 파일을 다운로드받아 구글 어스에서 열 경우 자세한 군사기지 위치를 볼 수 있도록 했습니다 

플레인맨이 게재한 각국 군사정보가 과연 얼마나 정확한지에 대해서는 알지 못합니다 플레인맨 자신이 말했듯 제인연감등 각종 군사잡지와 국방관련 인터넷사이트에서 정보를 얻어 일일이 좌표를 확인했으며 이를 구글 지도로 보여주듯 지금 현재, 오늘 기지가 없어졌는지는 모르지만 적어도 플레인맨이 언급한 군사기지등이 존재했음은 명확합니다 물론 매일 매일 새로 촬영한 위성사진을 분석하는 세계 각국의 국방당국의 최신 정보에는 미치지는 못하지만 적어도 어렴풋이 나마 세계 각국의 군사력을 살펴보는 유용한 자료임에 틀림이 없습니다 

저 또한 플레인맨의 자료에 나타난 좌표등으로 구글 어스를 검색, 북한 군사기지 위성사진을 캡쳐해 소개했고 현재도 많은 네티즌들이 플레인맨의 블로그를 참고하고 인용하는등 큰 인기를 누리고 있습니다  

플레인맨의 노력에 경의를 표합니다 







 
 

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South Korea. South Korea has 12 attack submarines and plans to increase its fleet to 27 by 2020.[57]

North Korea. North Korea has 22 old conventional attack submarines (how many are serviceable is unknown) and numerous mini-submarines.[58] While its submarines could theoretically threaten merchant shipping and unsophisticated naval combatants,[59] North Korea's submarines are not viewed as serious contenders in sea control operations.

원본 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/02/Submarine-Arms-Race-in-the-Pacific-The-Chinese-Challenge-to-US-Undersea-Supremacy

Submarine Arms Race in the Pacific: The Chinese Challenge to U.S. Undersea Supremacy

Published on February 2, 2010 by Mackenzie Eaglen and Jon Rodeback
Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, China has dramatically expanded its navy, especially its submarine fleet, adding dozens of attack submarines since 1995. During the same period, the U.S. attack submarine fleet has shrunk to 53, and it is projected to fall to 41 in 2028. The U.S. fleet is already stretched thin by the demands of ongoing operations. Australia, India, and other Pacific countries have taken note of the shifting balance and have responded with their own naval buildups, particularly of their submarine fleets. Unless the U.S. stops--and reverses--the decline of its own fleet, U.S. military superiority in the Pacific will continue to wane, severely limiting the Navy's ability to operate in the region, to protect U.S. interests, and to support U.S. friends and allies.

In April 2009, Australia announced its "biggest military buildup since World War II" in response to the changing regional security environment, specifically citing declining U.S. supremacy in the Pacific Ocean and China's rapidly growing navy.[1] This public announcement from a long-time, extremely loyal U.S. ally and friend should have been a loud wake-up call for the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Navy, and senior defense officials.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly emerging as a regional naval power and a potential global power, which "raises the prospect of intensifying security competition in East Asia both between the United States and China and between China and Japan."[2] Other Pacific countries in the region have also taken note of the changing security environment as evidenced in particular by their planned submarine acquisitions. Australia's military buildup includes doubling its submarine fleet from six submarines to 12 larger, more capable submarines.[3] In addition, "India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Singapore, Bangladesh and South Korea are planning to acquire modern, conventional submarines."[4] Both Australia and India have explicitly described their naval buildups as responses, at least in part, to China's naval buildup.

In contrast, the U.S. submarine fleet is projected to continue shrinking through 2028, further limiting the U.S. ability to shape and influence events in the Pacific. The U.S. attack submarine serves an important part in establishing sea control and supremacy, and it is not interchangeable with other assets. Its unique capabilities make it a force multiplier and allow it to "punch above its weight." To protect U.S. interests in East Asia and the Pacific, and to support and reassure U.S. allies, the U.S. must halt and then reverse the decline of its submarine fleet as a critical component of a broader policy to maintain the military balance in the Pacific.

Underwater Hide and Seek

Combining stealth with powerful weapon systems, submarines are uniquely suited to fulfill a wide range of missions, including strategic deterrence, sea control and denial, battlespace preparation, surveillance and intelligence gathering, special operations landings, and support for ground operations including land attack. Stealth is a primary ingredient to effective submarine operations. It enables a submarine to launch a sudden, devastating strike from an unexpected direction and to slip in and out of an area like a ghost. Stealth is also a submarine's primary defense because a submarine is extremely vulnerable to attack if discovered.

The four main types of submarines--diesel-electric attack submarines (SSs and SSKs), nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), guided-missile submarines (SSGNs), and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)--are differentiated by their primary armaments and propulsion systems.

Armament. The primary mission of attack submarines is to achieve sea supremacy by finding and eliminating enemy surface ships and submarines. Most modern attack submarines can also launch cruise missiles, which give them the capability to strike land targets. SSGNs armed with cruise missiles can either conduct sea supremacy missions against surface targets or attack land targets.[5] SSBNs armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) serve as part of the U.S., the Russian, and, soon, the Chinese nuclear deterrents.

Propulsion. The type of propulsion largely determines a submarine's capabilities, including range, endurance, speed, agility, and how quietly it can move undetected into and out of harm's way.

Many countries have deployed diesel-electric submarines, which are powered by a diesel engine when running on the surface and by electric batteries when submerged. When submerged, this type of submarine can be extremely quiet. Russia's Kilo-class submarines have earned the nickname "Black Hole" for their ability to evade detection.[6] However, this impressive stealth comes at the cost of limited range and speed and the need to resurface frequently--at least every few days--to recharge batteries.

Several countries have deployed non-nuclear, air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines (SSPs), which are similar in stealth and speed to traditional diesel-electric submarines, but can remain submerged for weeks at a time.[7] Clearly, this ability to remain submerged for protracted periods makes them less vulnerable to detection.

The major advantage of nuclear-powered submarines is their almost unlimited power reserves, which allow higher operating speeds, virtually unlimitedrange, and the ability to remain submerged for months at a time--limited only by their space to store provisions for the crew and the crew's endurance. Their major disadvantage is that nuclear reactors are inherently noisier than electric motors running on battery power, but this can be mitigated by materials and designs that reduce the submarine's acoustic signature. Nuclear-powered submarines have also become a source of international prestige. Few countries outside the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council have nuclear submarines.

Anti-Submarine Warfare. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW)is the use of ships, aircraft, submarines, and other platforms to detect, track, and destroy enemy submarines. Submarines are arguably the best ASW platforms because they are designed to operate in the same environment as their targets and have similar strengths and vulnerabilities. However, ASW helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft have advantages in range and speed, and they are almost invulnerable to the submarines they hunt.[8] Surface ships can be tremendously capable ASW platforms, but are more susceptible to submarine attack.

Destroying an enemy submarine--or at least forcing it to retire from the battlespace--first requires detection, usually by sonar. Active sonar-- the pings popularly portrayed in movies of World War II--can give the precise location of a sonar contact (e.g., the submarine), but it also reveals the location (or at least the bearing) of the sonar emitter and warns the enemy submarine that someone is looking for something. Passive sonar relies on "listening" to sonic and ultrasonic waves for the distinctive sounds of a submarine (or other ship). Modern passive sonar systems use computers to filter and interpret the sounds detected by sonar arrays towed by ships, sonar buoys, and other underwater sensors. Ideally, they identify the bearing, location, and type of the sonar contact.

Aircraft or satellites can also detect submarines just below the water surface, and satellites have successfully detected submerged submarines by identifying the effects of their movement through the water on the surface pattern of waves, although this capability is limited by "noise" from other sources, especially in turbulent seas.[9] Modern ASW is a challenging and costly endeavor that requires highly skilled experts, extensive training, and advanced equipment.

Submarine Fleets in the Pacific Ocean

Attack Submarine Deployment in the Pacific

Submarine fleets and deployments have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War.[10] During the 1990s, Russia withdrew most its submarines from service, and the U.S. steadily drew down its submarine force. While the number of U.S. submarines continues to decline, China is rapidly expanding and upgrading its submarine fleet. In response to a shifting military balance, other countries in the Pacific are also expanding and modernizing their fleets.

United States. The U.S. force of attack submarines fell from 102 boats in 1987 to 53 in 2009.[11] The decline has followed repeated revisions of the Navy's force structure plans since the Reagan-era 600-ship Navy called for 100 SSNs. The 1991 plan of George H. W. Bush called for 80, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) force-level study of 1992 reduced the goal to 55, and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) lowered the bar further to 50 SSNs.[12] The 2001 QDR reinstated the goal of maintaining 55 SSNs.[13] The 2006 QDR stated the goals of increasing production to two submarines per year by 2012 and deploying 60 percent of the U.S. submarine fleet to the Pacific to protect U.S. interests in that region.[14] The Navy's current proposal for a 313-ship fleet includes 48 SSNs, although some informed observers have questioned whether this number is sufficient to meet U.S. needs.[15]

The 1999 JCS Submarine Force Structure Study concluded that the optimal number of attack submarines to serve all of the military's and intelligence community's operational and collection requirements would be 68 SSNs in 2015 and 76 in 2025. A force of 55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025 was deemed a moderate security risk.[16] However, the current fleet of 53 nuclear-powered attack submarines[17] is smaller than even the moderate risk force proposed before September 11, 2001. The fleet is already overstretched, yet under the Navy's long-range procurement plan, the number of SSNs will fall below 48 boats between 2022 and 2033, bottoming out at 41 in 2028 and 2029.[18] (See Chart 1.)

The Shrinking U.S. Attack Submarine Fleet

To mitigate the projected "sub gap," the Navy is considering reducing Virginia-class construction time to 60 months, extending the service life of some Los Angeles-class subs by up to two years, and lengthening some deployments from six months to seven months. If successful, all of these measures combined would result in the force bottoming out at 44 or 45 submarines.[19] Yet these stopgap efforts will merely succeed in maintaining a force more appropriate to the pre-9/11 moderate risk scenario.

Neglected ASW Capabilities. The declining SSN force poses a challenge not only to the Navy's ability to maintain effective underwater deterrence, but also to the Navy's ASW efforts, which are already suffering from declining numbers of other ASW platforms.[20] The Navy has 173 aging P-3C patrol aircraft,[21] and the P-8A (the P-3C's replacement) is not scheduled to begin entering service until 2013. The Navy is also retiring the S-3B Viking, its only long-range carrier-based ASW aircraft, and has no plans to replace it.[22]

In addition, "[t]he Navy lacks a modern equivalent of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), the theater-wide acoustic detection system developed in the 1950s to detect Soviet submarines."[23] This is emblematic of broader weaknesses. Many systems deployed during the Cold War are of limited usefulness in today's threat environment. For example, fixed sensors used during the Cold War are not located in areas where conflict is most likely to occur this century. Furthermore, more countries are deploying advanced submarines that could threaten U.S. aircraft carriers, raising the stakes of U.S. military intervention.

Navy force structure must adapt to this evolving underwater threat environment. In July 2008, Navy officials testified before Congress about prioritizing relevant naval combat capability and recent developments that significantly changed how they view current threats. Vice Admiral Barry McCullough described the Navy's new perception of the threat environment:

Rapidly evolving traditional and asymmetric threats continue to pose increasing challenges to Combatant Commanders. State actors and non-state actors who, in the past, have only posed limited threats in the littoral are expanding their reach beyond their own shores with improved capabilities in blue water submarine operations, advanced anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. A number of countries who historically have only possessed regional military capabilities are investing in their Navy to extend their reach and influence as they compete in global markets. Our Navy will need to outpace other navies in the blue water ocean environment as they extend their reach. This will require us to continue to improve our blue water anti-submarine and anti-ballistic missile capabilities in order to counter improving anti-access strategies.[24]

The Navy has acknowledged its atrophying ASW capabilities in the face of "a re-emerging undersea threat" and has set the goal of developing more advanced sensors and anti-submarine weapons in the coming years.[25] The U.S. Pacific Fleet has reportedly already increased ASW training.[26] These are critical efforts that must be sustained alongside a goal to increase the procurement of additional ASW platforms--primarily submarines and long-range maritime surveillance aircraft.

China. Since the end of the Cold War, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of the People's Republic of China has dramatically expanded and upgraded its navy, especially its submarine fleet, which is "now considered the PLAN's most 'potent strength.'"[27] According to the Pentagon, China has the largest naval force in Asia,[28] including 60 attack submarines (six SSNs and 54 diesel attack submarines).[29] More than half of its diesel submarines are the more modern Kilo-class, Song-class, and Yuan-class submarines.[30] One observer has noted that "China now has more submarines than Russia, and the speed [at which] they are building them is amazing."[31]

Submarine Fleet Expansion. China is well on its way to achieving its goal of building a credible blue-water navy that can project power well beyond its shores:

In order to grasp the energy that China is now committing to undersea warfare, consider that during 2002-2004 China's navy launched thirteen submarines while simultaneously undertaking the purchase of submarines from Russia on an unprecedented scale. Indeed, China commissioned thirty-one new submarines between 1995 and 2005. Given this rapid evolution, appraisals of China's capability to field competent and lethal diesel submarines in the littorals have slowly changed from ridicule to grudging respect of late. China's potential for complex technological development is finally being taken seriously abroad.[32]

Estimates of the future size of China's attack submarine fleet vary widely from 58 boats to 88 boats,[33] depending on how quickly older submarines are retired from service, whether building more expensive SSNs will reduce total submarine production, and additional purchases of foreign-built submarines. In recent years, China has introduced four new classes of domestically designed and built submarines: Jin or Type 094 (SSBN), Shang or Type 093 (SSN), Yuan or Type 041/039A (SSP), and Song or Type 039/039G (SSK). A successor to the Shang-class is reportedly in development.[34] This degree of sustained investment in submarine development and building suggests that the upper end of the range (possibly 70 or more) is a more realistic estimate of PLAN force structure in the coming decades.

Increased Patrols. The Chinese attack submarine fleet has noticeably increased its patrol rate from two patrols in 2006 to six in 2007 to 12 in 2008.[35] This suggests a new focus on training and a desire to demonstrate to other actors, particularly the United States, that China is a maritime power in the Pacific. Two recent incidents highlight this trend. On October 26, 2006, a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced within five miles of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk--inside its screen of escorts--which was operating near Okinawa.[36] On June 11, 2009, a Chinese submarine collided with the USS John S. McCain's towed sonar array off the Philippines.[37] Whatever these incidents may or may not reveal about the limitations of U.S. ASW capabilities and the competence of Chinese submariners[38]--the most useful information is almost certainly classified--they clearly demonstrate that China's submarines are ranging farther afield and operating more aggressively than in the past.

Objectives.A number of considerations and objectives could help to explain China's rapid expansion of its attack submarine fleet: basic Chinese defense needs, limiting the U.S. ability to "interfere" in China-Taiwan relations, challenging U.S. dominance in the Pacific, protecting the Chinese SSBN nuclear deterrent, and winning greater international prestige.

First, the bulk of China's wealth and population is concentrated on its east coast, which gives China a compelling reason to deploy a robust naval deterrent along that coast.

Alternatively, many security experts argue that "China's main objective in upgrading its submarine fleet is the ability to delay or deter a United States intervention on behalf of Taiwan."[39] China has been bedeviled by the "renegade province" of Taiwan and by U.S. meddling (from China's perspective) in cross-strait relations since 1949. When relations across the Taiwan Strait became particularly tense in 1996, the U.S. sent two carrier battle groups to the area to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Unsurprisingly, China has since placed a high priority on developing sea denial capabilities that could discourage and, if necessary, delay or prevent U.S. military intervention in a future cross-strait dispute.[40] The U.S. Department of Defense has concluded that, "Acquisition and development of the Kilo, Song, Shang, and Yuan-class submarines illustrates the importance the PLA places on undersea warfare for sea denial."[41]

The PLAN may also be emulating Soviet naval strategy, which "rapidly overcame the [Soviet Union's] unfavorable geostrategic situation" by using nuclear submarines to give it "an ocean-going navy with offensive capability."[42] A similar strategy would help the PLAN to break the "island chain blockade" of mainland China. The new naval base on Hainan Island adds an additional wrinkle, giving the PLAN "direct access to vital international sea lanes, and offer[ing] the potential for stealthy deployment of submarines into the deep waters of the South China Sea."[43]

As part of its nuclear deterrent, China is expected to build as many as five Jin-class SSBN submarines, each armed with 12 SLBMs capable of reaching U.S. territory from positions off the Chinese coast. This would constitute a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.[44] China may want to use some of its SSNs to escort SSBN deterrence patrols.[45]

Finally, it seems clear that China intends to become a global power, and "it appears to be conventional wisdom in the PRC that nuclear submarines represent one of China's clearest claims to status as a great power."[46] A strong attack submarine fleet would also help to protect Chinese shipping around the world. The Yin He incident in 1993 helped to solidify this concern among PRC leaders, who were "extremely furious, but had no recourse" when the U.S. insisted on inspecting a Chinese freighter suspected of carrying ingredients of chemical weapons to Iran.[47]

Australia. Australia has six diesel-electric submarines and has announced plans to replace them as part of a broader naval modernization program with 12 modern conventional submarines armed with cruise missiles.[48] The Australian government has explicitly tied this expansion to the rise of China as a naval power and weakening U.S. naval supremacy,[49] which Australia believes has "played a stabilizing role across the world and especially so in the Asia-Pacific region."[50]

India. While geographically not a Pacific country, India exercises growing influence in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific. India has 16 diesel-powered attack submarines and recently launched its first SSN, which is based on the Russian Akula-class. India will lease a second Akula-class submarine from Russia and is building six Scorpene-class diesel submarines.[51]

India's planned expansion and upgrade of its submarine fleet is part of a larger effort to add more than 100 warships to the Indian navy over 10 years. The Indian Ministry of Defense explains the shipbuilding program as a "strategic necessity" of national defense, largely in terms of countering the Chinese naval buildup: "China is developing its navy at a great rate. Its ambitions in the Indian Ocean are quite clear."[52] India also aspires to become a great power, and submarines are seen as an integral part of any major power's fleet.

Russia. The Russian (formerly Soviet) submarine fleet shrank by almost two-thirds after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In recent years, the Russian navy has emerged from its post-Soviet crisis, but still needs to decommission dozens of nuclear submarines left over from the Cold War. In 2009, Russia had 17 SSNs and 20 diesel submarines, of which five SSNs and nine diesel submarines were assigned to the Pacific fleet.[53] Despite massive budget increases in recent years, "the navy is haunted by insufficient funding, which limits its ability to conduct regular overhauls of operational submarines and even to maintain them in a combat-ready state."[54]

Japan. Japan maintains a modern submarine fleet of at least 16 boats, including at least one new Soryu-class AIP submarine.[55] Japan has historically replaced its submarines after about 16 years of service, much more quickly than other countries retire theirs.[56]

South Korea. South Korea has 12 attack submarines and plans to increase its fleet to 27 by 2020.[57]

North Korea. North Korea has 22 old conventional attack submarines (how many are serviceable is unknown) and numerous mini-submarines.[58] While its submarines could theoretically threaten merchant shipping and unsophisticated naval combatants,[59] North Korea's submarines are not viewed as serious contenders in sea control operations.

Taiwan. Taiwan operates two attack submarines and has explored numerous options to expand and upgrade its submarine fleet, including domestic construction. In 2001, the U.S. offered Taiwan an arms package that included eight diesel-electric submarines, but the U.S. does not own the rights to any current diesel submarine designs, and the proposal appears to be dead.[60]

Southeast Asia. In the context of China and India deploying nuclear-powered submarines, most countries in Southeast Asia are expanding or upgrading their existing submarine fleets. Indonesia has two submarines and has announced a plan to build 12 submarines by 2024.[61] Vietnam has ordered six Kilo-class submarines from Russia.[62] Singapore has recently acquired two Archer-class AIP submarines to replace two of its four aging boats.[63] In October 2007, Malaysia received delivery of its first submarine, a Scorpene-class boat built in France. The second is scheduled for delivery in 2010.[64] Thailand has no submarines, but has expressed increasing interest in acquiring several.[65]

Sustaining U.S. Undersea Supremacy

Over the past 16 years, China has rapidly expanded its submarine fleet while the U.S. has steadily drawn down its submarine forces even as combatant commanders have demanded more of their capabilities. U.S. allies and friends have expressed legitimate concerns about the shifting security environment in the Pacific.

The U.S. has acknowledged this shifting balance--at least in part--and has begun to address it. The Navy appears to be on course to fulfilling the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review directive to deploy 60 percent of the U.S. submarine fleet in the Pacific,[66] but deploying a higher percentage of a shrinking fleet will likely prove less effective than increasing the total number of submarines.

To halt and eventually reverse the erosion of U.S. undersea supremacy in the Pacific Ocean, to reassure and support U.S. allies, and to protect long-standing U.S. interests in the region, the U.S. should:

  • Build additional attack submarines more rapidly. Congress should increase procurement of Virginia-class submarines to at least two per year with the objective of fielding a force of at least 60 fast attack submarines.[67] Yet by itself, procuring new boats at the rate of two per year will not replace the Los Angeles-class submarines as quickly as they are scheduled to be decommissioned.
  • Overhaul and modernize selected Los Angeles-class submarines to extend their service life. While overhauling and modernizing submarines will require additional funding, extending the service life of older submarines that are still in good condition--instead of decommissioning them as planned--would help to close the "sub gap" over the short term at a lower cost than drastically increasing submarine construction.
  • Forward-base more submarines. Basing more submarines in Guam, Hawaii, and possibly Japan--in addition to the three SSNs already based in Guam--would place them closer to East Asia, where their services are most likely to be needed, and would allow them to maximize time on station and minimize travel time to and from their home ports.[68] The Navy should also consider acquiring additional submarine tenders, which would allow the creation of temporary forward bases where submarines could rotate crews and rearm.
  • Reevaluate the use of diesel submarines. Congress should direct the Navy to study the utility of using AIP attack submarines to help to close the gap between regional commander requirements and the number of available U.S. submarines. In the short term, as domestic production capabilities develop, the U.S. could buy submarines from U.S. allies.[69] Developing a U.S. conventional submarine capability would also facilitate more robust ASW training and afford the U.S. the option to sell advanced diesel submarines to Taiwan.
  • Research, develop, and deploy undersea force multipliers. Fielding unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) can enhance the range, capabilities, and lethality of existing undersea weapons, platforms, and sensors.[70] However, UUVs should not be viewed as replacements for attack submarines. The U.S. will need to continue deploying manned submarines for the foreseeable future while upgrading and enhancing their capabilities to counter developing and potential threats.
  • Enhance anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Atrophied U.S. ASW capabilities are particularly worrisome because developing skilled ASW personnel requires years of intensive training. Congress should allocate sufficient and stable funding to increase ASW capabilities both qualitatively and quantitatively. Specifically, Congress should increase the number of ASW platforms by expanding and accelerating the P-8 program and by building more ships with ASW capabilities, including more DDG-1000 destroyers or upgraded DDG-51s with towed sonar arrays.[71]
  • Work with the militaries of U.S. allies and friends to improve their submarine and ASW capabilities. These efforts should include more frequent and intensive multilateral exercises and maneuvers, technology sharing, and joint planning. Strengthening the capacity and capabilities of friendly foreign navies would allow the U.S. to employ fewer of its own resources in certain contingencies and missions, thereby freeing up U.S. submarines for other pressing needs.
  • Encourage greater Chinese transparency in security matters through military-to-military channels. Greater Chinese transparency about its military may resolve or ease some of the concerns about China's naval buildup. Greater understanding may also help to prevent or defuse future incidents involving the U.S. and Chinese militaries. China's failure to give prior notice to the U.S. military of its recent missile defense test--contrary to common international practice--weakens transparency efforts and leads to many unanswered questions.

Conclusion

The shifting security environment in the Pacific Ocean and East Asia has caused serious concern among U.S. allies and friends. Several have responded by launching aggressive naval buildups, and Australia has openly tied its defense buildup to the shifting China-U.S. balance in the Pacific.

The U.S. Navy is still the most powerful navy in the world, and it has the best-trained and most capable submarine force, but its declining numbers have been stretched thin by the demands of ongoing operations and other assigned missions. The continuing decline of the U.S. submarine fleet, in particular, threatens U.S. undersea supremacy in the Pacific and therefore could seriously undermine the Navy's ability to operate effectively in East Asia and the Pacific.

Unless the U.S. rebuilds its submarine fleet and enhances the Navy's ASW capabilities, U.S. military superiority in the Pacific will continue to wane, leading to avoidable political and economic hazards for the U.S. and its friends and allies.

Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Jon Rodeback is Research Editor at The Heritage Foundation. Julia I. Bertelsmann, a Research Assistant in the Allison Center, assisted in researching and writing this paper.

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SIPRI 검색을 통해 북한의 잠수함 수입내역을 추적해 봤습니다
중국과 러시아에서 수입한 내역만 검색했더니 북한은 러시아[구 소련]으로 부터 이미 1960년에 위스키급 잠수함 4척을
수입한 것으로 나타났습니다     
위스키급 613형 4대 였습니다
북한은 또 중국으로 부터 1973년에 로메오급 잠수함을 도입하기 시작해 1995년까지 모두 23척을 수입한 것으로 조사됐습니다
이중 16척은 중국측의 기술이전으로 북한내 조선소에서 건조된 것으로 보입니다
잠수함외에도 중국과 러시아로 부터 초계정등을 많이 수입한 것으로 확인됐습니다
이외에도 중국과 러시아에서 수입된 해군관련 무기들도 더 있으리라 생각합니다
유고급 잠수정 수입내역도 알아보려했지만 유고가 국가명이 변경되면서 검색이 잘 되지 않았습니다
북한은 또 이란에 길이 20미터이하의 TIR급 스텔스함정도 2002년부터 2004년까지 10척 수출했으며 이보다 더 작은
백합급 어뢰정 10척, 대동급 반잠수 어뢰정을 3대이상 수출한 것으로 나타났습니다 
아래는 제가 소트한 자료입니다
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by recipient. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 1951 to 2009
Note: The ‘No. delivered/produced’ and the ‘Year(s) of deliveries’ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed separately. The ‘Comments’ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Information generated: 04 April 2010

 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

Recipient/                                                                                                                      Year       Year(s)        No.                  
      supplier (S)        No.                Weapon                            Weapon                      of order/   of                 delivered/        
      or licenser (L)    ordered        designation                       description                 licence      deliveries     produced         Comments


---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

North Korea

S: China                          (15)          P-6                                     FAC(T)                         (1967)     1967-1968             (15)        

                                                   (23)                                    Type-062/Shanghai       Patrol craft                         (1967)         1967-1978              (23)           Shanghai-2 version

                                                   (6)                                      Hainan/Type-037          Patrol craft                         (1974)         1975-1978              6               

                                                   (4)                                      Huangfen/Type-021      FAC(M)  (1979)                  1980         4

     USSR                        2          Artillerist                            Patrol craft                    (1953)     1954                        (2)         Ex-Soviet

                                                   (8)                                      Tral                               Minesweeper                     (1954)         1954-1955              (8)           Ex-Soviet

                                                   (45)                                    P-6                                FAC(T)   (1956)         1957-1959         (27)       No. may be up to 45

                                                   8                                         SO-1                             Patrol craft                         (1957)         1957-1960              (8)            

                                                   (29)                                    P-4                                FAC(T)   (1958)         1958-1960         (29)       Supplier uncertain; possibly ex-Soviet but could be from China; possibly assembled/produced in North Korea

                                                   4                                         Whiskey/Type-613       Submarine                         (1960)         1960      4                Ex-Soviet

                                                   2                                         T-43/Type-010              Minesweeper                     (1962)         1963      2                Ex-Soviet

                                                   12                                       Osa/Type-205               FAC(M)  (1967)                  1968         12          Ex-Soviet (but maximum only few years old); Osa-1 version

                                                   10                                       Komar/Type-183          FAC(M)  (1969)         1970-1972         (6)         Ex-Soviet

                                                   (2)                                      Osa/Type-205               FAC(M)  (1972)                  1972         (2)         Ex-Soviet; Osa-1 version

                                                   4                                         Shershen                       FAC(T)   (1973)         1973-1974         4 Probably ex-Soviet

                                                   (2)                                      Osa/Type-205               FAC(M)  (1982)                  1983         (2)         Ex-Soviet; Osa-1 version

 

L: China                            23          Romeo/Type-633               Submarine                     (1973)     1973-1995             (23)         16 assembled/produced in North Korea

     USSR                   (11)          SO-1                                  Patrol craft                    (1959)     1961-1965             (11)        

                                                   (10)                                    P-4                                FAC(T)   (1960)         1961-1965         (10)      

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천안함 침몰과 관련해 미국 정부가 공식적 언급을 자제하고 있는 가운데 오키나와 주둔 미 해병대 사령관이
북한 핵 문제를 언급했습니다.
오키나와 주둔 미해병대의 작전목표가 여러 돌발상황에 대비하기 위한 것이라는 기존 언급과는 달리 북한 핵이 가장 큰 
작전 목표라고 말한 것입니다 
천안함 침몰과 어떤 관련이 있는지 모르겠습니다,
미숙하지만 간단히 번역하고 혹시모를 오역을 피하기 위해 원문을 첨부합니다
===========================================================================================================

오키나와주둔 미 해병의 가장 큰 작전 목표는 북한 핵무기 [억제]라고 미해병대 태평양사령관이 오늘 밝혔습니다

케이스 스탤더 미해병대 태평양사령관[중장]은 오늘 일본 오키나와에서 한 지역방송과 인터뷰를 갖고 미 해병대의 제1 작전타겟은 북한 핵이라고 밝혔습니다

원본출처 http://en.rian.ru/world/20100401/158389935.html

스탤더사령관은 미사일시험발사를 한 북한에 대한 경제제재에 이어 지난 2008년 김정일이 병약해진데다 북한의 식량난등이
심각해 지면서 핵무기를 가진 외툴이 정권인 북한체제의 안정성에 대한 관심이 커지고 있다고 말했다고 kbs 월드가 보도했습니다

스탤더사령관은 남북한 충돌에 의한 북한 붕괴보다는 자체 붕괴가능성이 더 높다며 이 경우 신속하게 북한 핵무기를 제거하는
것이 해병대의 가장 중요한 임무라고 설명했습니다

일본 마이니치신문은 스탤더사령관이 지난 2월 17일 일본주재 주미대사관에서 일본 방위청 관계자를 만난 자리에서 이같은
발언을 했지만 공식적인 발표원고에는 이같은 말이 없었다고 전했습니다

일본주재 주미대사관에 게재된 원고에는 '오키나와 주둔 해병의 제1 임무가 한국전쟁에 대한 대비라고 최근 미국언론들이 보도하고 있지만 그것은 잘못된 것이다, 우리는 10여개의 우발상황에 대비하고 있다'고 기록돼 있습니다

최근 북한은 미국의 군사적 위협과 도발이 계속된다면 핵무기로 응징할 것이라는 성명을 발표했었습니다

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A U.S. military commander was quoted as saying by the regional media on Thursday that North Korea's nuclear weapons have been the principal "operational target" for U.S. marines, stationed in Japan's Okinawa.

원본출처 http://en.rian.ru/world/20100401/158389935.html

Concerns over stability of the reclusive regime, which possesses nuclear weaons, have deepened since the reports of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il's ailing health surfaced in 2008 and severe food shortages hit the country following economic sanctions against Pyongyang for its nuclear and missile tests.

"[U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific Commander Lieutenant General Keith] Stalder reportedly said that the odds of a Kim Jong-il regime collapse are higher than an inter-Korean clash and that in the case of a collapse, swift removal of its nuclear weapons is the Marine Corps' most critical task," South Korea's international broadcaster, KBS World, said.

Japan's Mainichi Shimbun daily said Stalder made the statement during the meeting with a Japanese defense official at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo on February 17.

However, the official transcript of Stalder's February speech at the embassy contains no such statements.

"Some recent press stories in the U.S. claim that the Marines are on Okinawa primarily to prepare to fight in Korea. That assertion is of course untrue. Okinawa Marines train to respond to dozens of different emergencies and contingencies," the statement, available on the website of the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, says.

In a recent statement, Pyongyang threatened to boost its nuclear capability in response to what it considered "continuing U.S. military threats and provocations," referring to joint annual exercises conducted by the U.S. and S. Korean military near its borders.

MOSCOW, April 1 (RIA Novosti)

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’Yugo’ type midget sub

Dimensions: L 20m, W 2m, Displacement 90t (submerged)
Speed : 10kts surfaced, 4 kts submerged
Armament: 2 x533-mm externally-mounted torpedoes in drop gear in some variants, possibly torpedo tubes in some and none in infiltration variants.

The Yugo class is so named because it was built to plans supplied by Yugoslavia in 1965. North Korea had started an indigenous midget-submarine programme prior to that but had been somewhat unsuccessful, with a crude submarine being captured by the South in 1965 after its crew abandoned it when it was beached on a mudflat during a receding tide on the Han River:
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천안함 침몰사고의 원인으로 북한 잠수정 또는 반잠수정에 의한 어뢰·기뢰의 공격 가능성이 거론되고 있는 가운데 사고 발생지역인 백령도에서 멀지 않은 북한 서해안 잠수함 기지에서 천안함이 침몰한 지난 26일을 전후해 잠수정(또는 반잠수정)이 사라졌다가 다시 나타난 사실이 확인된 것으로 알려졌다.

원본출처 조선일보 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/03/31/2010033100165.html?Dep1=news&Dep2=headline1&Dep3=h1_01_rel01

정부 소식통은 30일 "천안함 침몰사고 이후 미 정찰위성 사진 등을 정밀 분석해본 결과, 백령도에서 50여㎞ 떨어진 사곶기지에서 잠수정(반잠수정)이 지난 26일을 전후해 며칠간 사라졌다가 다시 기지로 복귀한 것으로 파악된 것으로 안다"고 말했다. 움직임을 보인 잠수정(반잠수정)의 종류와 숫자(규모)에 대해선 확인되지 않았다.

이 소식통은 "북 잠수정이나 반잠수정이 기지에서 사라졌다가 나타나는 경우는 종종 있는 일이어서 이번 사고와의 연관성을 단정하기는 힘들다"며 "구체적인 정황을 확인 중"이라고 전했다. 지난 1998년 속초 앞바다에서 꽁치 그물에 걸려 잡혔던 유고급 잠수정은 85t급으로 406㎜ 어뢰 2문을 장착하고 있다. 수심 30m 안팎 해저에서도 은밀한 수중침투 및 공격이 가능한 것으로 전해졌다.

보다 작은 반잠수정도 물 위로 항해할 때도 레이더에 잡히기 힘들며 어뢰 2발을 발사할 수 있다. 김태영 국방장관도 29일 국회 국방위에서 "북한 반잠수정은 어뢰 2발을 발사할 수 있다"며 반잠수정에 의한 피격 가능성을 부인하지 않았다.

북한 서해함대의 핵심전력인 8전대가 있는 사곶기지엔 20여척의 잠수정 및 반잠수정이 배치돼 있는 것으로 알려졌다. 
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