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15일 오후 8시58분쯤 전라남도 진도 동남방 14.5㎞ 지점 추자도 근해에서 초계 비행을 하던 해군 3함대사령부 소속 링스(LYNX) 헬기가 추락, 권모 대위 등 탑승자 4명이 전원 실종됐다고 군 관계자가 밝혔다.

원본출처 조선일보 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/04/15/2010041502525.html?Dep1=news&Dep2=headline1&Dep3=h1_02

이 헬기는 잠수함 수색을 하던 것으로 알려져 최근 천안함 침몰과 관련한 임무를 띤 것이 아닌가 하는 관측이 나오고 있다.

군과 해경은 사고 직후 고속정 2척과 해경 경비함 8척을 사고 해역에 보내 수색 중이다.

군 관계자는 “이 헬기는 11년 된 신형으로 계기비행이 가능하고 날씨도 좋았다”며 “현재 사고 원인을 조사 중”이라고 밝혔다

링스 헬기는 수상함정에 탑재, 대잠수함작전 또는 대수상 용도로 운영하는 기종으로 우리 해군은 1990년대부터 도입, 광개토대왕급 구축함과 충무공 이순신급 구축함, 이지스함인 세종대왕함 등에서 운용하고 있다.

1998년 6월 한국 영해에서 유자망에 걸려 좌초한 북한의 유고급 잠수정에 대한 예인작전 등에 참가했고, 2009년 5월 소말리아 해역에 파견된 문무대왕함에 탑재, 해적 퇴치 작전에 참가하기도 했다.


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천안함이 침몰하던 지난달 26일 오후 9시22분쯤 합동참모본부 이상의 의장은 대전 교육사령부에서 열린 합동성 강화 대토론회를 마치고 고속철(KTX)로 서울로 올라가기 위해 서대전역에 도착했다. 이 의장은 사고 발생 5분 뒤인 오후 9시27분 KTX 열차에 탔다. 천안함 포술장이 2함대사에 구조요청을 한 게 9시28분이었다. 오후 9시31분 속초함이 사고 해역으로 급파되고 1분 뒤 해군 제2함대 사령부가 해경에 긴급 구조 요청을 할 때도 이 의장은 아무 것도 모른 채 쉬고 있었다.

원본출처 조선일보 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/04/15/2010041500118.html?Dep1=news&Dep2=top&Dep3=top

오후 10시11분 이 의장 휴대전화가 울렸다. 합참 작전참모부장이 이 의장에게 천안함 사태를 긴급 보고했다. 작참부장은 3분 후인 10시14분 국방부 장관에게도 첫 보고를 했다. 이 의장은 10시42분 국방부 내 합참 전투통제실에 도착해 장관과 함께 상황평가회의를 했다. 천안함이 알 수 없는 이유로 침몰한 뒤 떠내려가는 동안에도 국군은 사고 발생 후 49분까지 지휘부 공백 상태에서 굴러가고 있었던 셈이다.

사고 초기부터 합참은 "(의장이)열차로 이동하는 동안 휴대전화로 보고를 받고 상황 지시를 했다"고 해명해왔다. 그러나 김태영 장관은 14일 국방위원회에서 유승민 한나라당 의원이 "전쟁이 나면 한 시간 뒤쯤 보고 받으실 겁니까?"라고 추궁하자, "상황을 전파하는 과정에서 합참 지휘통제반장이 합참의장과 장관에게 보고하는 것을 깜빡했다"고 답했다. 그동안 합참이 거짓 해명을 해온 사실이 드러난 것이다. 합참은 침투, 교전, 대량 인명사고 발생 등 17개 사항에 대해 지휘통제반장이 장관, 의장, 작전본부장에게 즉시 보고하도록 규정하고 있다.

합참은 사건 발생 23분 뒤인 9시45분 2함대 사령부로부터 첫 상황보고를 받았고, 9시51분 청와대 위기상황센터에 상황을 알렸다. 오후 10시 긴급 안보관계장관회의가 소집됐으나 합참의장으로부터 보고를 받지 못한 국방장관은 이 때까지 천안함 사태를 모르고 있었다. 한때 군 내부에선 "당시 의장이 만찬장에서 술을 마셔 보고를 받지 못했다"는 의혹이 돌았으나, 합참은 "와인 1잔을 마신게 전부"라고 부인했다.

합참의장은 육·해·공 3군 합동 군사작전을 총괄하는 최고 지휘관이다. 그 합참의장이 국가 비상사태에 버금가는 상황을 49분간이나 전혀 모르고 있었다는 사실 자체가 심각한 문제라는 게 군 안팎의 시각이다. 군 관계자는 "'보고가 생명'이라는 군에서 솔직히 있을 수 없는 일이 발생했다"고 고백했다.

군이 사고 발생 시간을 9시45분에서 9시30분, 9시25분, 9시15분, 다시 9시22분으로 오락가락 발표하며 혼선을 빚은 것도 사고 초기 지휘부 공백 때문이 아니었냐는 지적도 나온다. 군사적 대응도 머뭇거렸다. 긴급 상황을 통보받고 공군 전투기 편대가 출동한 시각은 침몰 1시간14분 뒤인 오후 10시36분이었다.

국방부는 "전비(전투준비)태세검열단 감찰을 통해 지휘체계 문란 여부를 조사해 신상필벌을 명확히 하겠다"며 "필요하다면 감사원에 보강조사를 요청하는 방안도 적극 검토 중"이라고 밝혔다.
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South Korea. South Korea has 12 attack submarines and plans to increase its fleet to 27 by 2020.[57]

North Korea. North Korea has 22 old conventional attack submarines (how many are serviceable is unknown) and numerous mini-submarines.[58] While its submarines could theoretically threaten merchant shipping and unsophisticated naval combatants,[59] North Korea's submarines are not viewed as serious contenders in sea control operations.

원본 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/02/Submarine-Arms-Race-in-the-Pacific-The-Chinese-Challenge-to-US-Undersea-Supremacy

Submarine Arms Race in the Pacific: The Chinese Challenge to U.S. Undersea Supremacy

Published on February 2, 2010 by Mackenzie Eaglen and Jon Rodeback
Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, China has dramatically expanded its navy, especially its submarine fleet, adding dozens of attack submarines since 1995. During the same period, the U.S. attack submarine fleet has shrunk to 53, and it is projected to fall to 41 in 2028. The U.S. fleet is already stretched thin by the demands of ongoing operations. Australia, India, and other Pacific countries have taken note of the shifting balance and have responded with their own naval buildups, particularly of their submarine fleets. Unless the U.S. stops--and reverses--the decline of its own fleet, U.S. military superiority in the Pacific will continue to wane, severely limiting the Navy's ability to operate in the region, to protect U.S. interests, and to support U.S. friends and allies.

In April 2009, Australia announced its "biggest military buildup since World War II" in response to the changing regional security environment, specifically citing declining U.S. supremacy in the Pacific Ocean and China's rapidly growing navy.[1] This public announcement from a long-time, extremely loyal U.S. ally and friend should have been a loud wake-up call for the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Navy, and senior defense officials.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly emerging as a regional naval power and a potential global power, which "raises the prospect of intensifying security competition in East Asia both between the United States and China and between China and Japan."[2] Other Pacific countries in the region have also taken note of the changing security environment as evidenced in particular by their planned submarine acquisitions. Australia's military buildup includes doubling its submarine fleet from six submarines to 12 larger, more capable submarines.[3] In addition, "India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Singapore, Bangladesh and South Korea are planning to acquire modern, conventional submarines."[4] Both Australia and India have explicitly described their naval buildups as responses, at least in part, to China's naval buildup.

In contrast, the U.S. submarine fleet is projected to continue shrinking through 2028, further limiting the U.S. ability to shape and influence events in the Pacific. The U.S. attack submarine serves an important part in establishing sea control and supremacy, and it is not interchangeable with other assets. Its unique capabilities make it a force multiplier and allow it to "punch above its weight." To protect U.S. interests in East Asia and the Pacific, and to support and reassure U.S. allies, the U.S. must halt and then reverse the decline of its submarine fleet as a critical component of a broader policy to maintain the military balance in the Pacific.

Underwater Hide and Seek

Combining stealth with powerful weapon systems, submarines are uniquely suited to fulfill a wide range of missions, including strategic deterrence, sea control and denial, battlespace preparation, surveillance and intelligence gathering, special operations landings, and support for ground operations including land attack. Stealth is a primary ingredient to effective submarine operations. It enables a submarine to launch a sudden, devastating strike from an unexpected direction and to slip in and out of an area like a ghost. Stealth is also a submarine's primary defense because a submarine is extremely vulnerable to attack if discovered.

The four main types of submarines--diesel-electric attack submarines (SSs and SSKs), nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), guided-missile submarines (SSGNs), and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)--are differentiated by their primary armaments and propulsion systems.

Armament. The primary mission of attack submarines is to achieve sea supremacy by finding and eliminating enemy surface ships and submarines. Most modern attack submarines can also launch cruise missiles, which give them the capability to strike land targets. SSGNs armed with cruise missiles can either conduct sea supremacy missions against surface targets or attack land targets.[5] SSBNs armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) serve as part of the U.S., the Russian, and, soon, the Chinese nuclear deterrents.

Propulsion. The type of propulsion largely determines a submarine's capabilities, including range, endurance, speed, agility, and how quietly it can move undetected into and out of harm's way.

Many countries have deployed diesel-electric submarines, which are powered by a diesel engine when running on the surface and by electric batteries when submerged. When submerged, this type of submarine can be extremely quiet. Russia's Kilo-class submarines have earned the nickname "Black Hole" for their ability to evade detection.[6] However, this impressive stealth comes at the cost of limited range and speed and the need to resurface frequently--at least every few days--to recharge batteries.

Several countries have deployed non-nuclear, air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines (SSPs), which are similar in stealth and speed to traditional diesel-electric submarines, but can remain submerged for weeks at a time.[7] Clearly, this ability to remain submerged for protracted periods makes them less vulnerable to detection.

The major advantage of nuclear-powered submarines is their almost unlimited power reserves, which allow higher operating speeds, virtually unlimitedrange, and the ability to remain submerged for months at a time--limited only by their space to store provisions for the crew and the crew's endurance. Their major disadvantage is that nuclear reactors are inherently noisier than electric motors running on battery power, but this can be mitigated by materials and designs that reduce the submarine's acoustic signature. Nuclear-powered submarines have also become a source of international prestige. Few countries outside the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council have nuclear submarines.

Anti-Submarine Warfare. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW)is the use of ships, aircraft, submarines, and other platforms to detect, track, and destroy enemy submarines. Submarines are arguably the best ASW platforms because they are designed to operate in the same environment as their targets and have similar strengths and vulnerabilities. However, ASW helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft have advantages in range and speed, and they are almost invulnerable to the submarines they hunt.[8] Surface ships can be tremendously capable ASW platforms, but are more susceptible to submarine attack.

Destroying an enemy submarine--or at least forcing it to retire from the battlespace--first requires detection, usually by sonar. Active sonar-- the pings popularly portrayed in movies of World War II--can give the precise location of a sonar contact (e.g., the submarine), but it also reveals the location (or at least the bearing) of the sonar emitter and warns the enemy submarine that someone is looking for something. Passive sonar relies on "listening" to sonic and ultrasonic waves for the distinctive sounds of a submarine (or other ship). Modern passive sonar systems use computers to filter and interpret the sounds detected by sonar arrays towed by ships, sonar buoys, and other underwater sensors. Ideally, they identify the bearing, location, and type of the sonar contact.

Aircraft or satellites can also detect submarines just below the water surface, and satellites have successfully detected submerged submarines by identifying the effects of their movement through the water on the surface pattern of waves, although this capability is limited by "noise" from other sources, especially in turbulent seas.[9] Modern ASW is a challenging and costly endeavor that requires highly skilled experts, extensive training, and advanced equipment.

Submarine Fleets in the Pacific Ocean

Attack Submarine Deployment in the Pacific

Submarine fleets and deployments have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War.[10] During the 1990s, Russia withdrew most its submarines from service, and the U.S. steadily drew down its submarine force. While the number of U.S. submarines continues to decline, China is rapidly expanding and upgrading its submarine fleet. In response to a shifting military balance, other countries in the Pacific are also expanding and modernizing their fleets.

United States. The U.S. force of attack submarines fell from 102 boats in 1987 to 53 in 2009.[11] The decline has followed repeated revisions of the Navy's force structure plans since the Reagan-era 600-ship Navy called for 100 SSNs. The 1991 plan of George H. W. Bush called for 80, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) force-level study of 1992 reduced the goal to 55, and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) lowered the bar further to 50 SSNs.[12] The 2001 QDR reinstated the goal of maintaining 55 SSNs.[13] The 2006 QDR stated the goals of increasing production to two submarines per year by 2012 and deploying 60 percent of the U.S. submarine fleet to the Pacific to protect U.S. interests in that region.[14] The Navy's current proposal for a 313-ship fleet includes 48 SSNs, although some informed observers have questioned whether this number is sufficient to meet U.S. needs.[15]

The 1999 JCS Submarine Force Structure Study concluded that the optimal number of attack submarines to serve all of the military's and intelligence community's operational and collection requirements would be 68 SSNs in 2015 and 76 in 2025. A force of 55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025 was deemed a moderate security risk.[16] However, the current fleet of 53 nuclear-powered attack submarines[17] is smaller than even the moderate risk force proposed before September 11, 2001. The fleet is already overstretched, yet under the Navy's long-range procurement plan, the number of SSNs will fall below 48 boats between 2022 and 2033, bottoming out at 41 in 2028 and 2029.[18] (See Chart 1.)

The Shrinking U.S. Attack Submarine Fleet

To mitigate the projected "sub gap," the Navy is considering reducing Virginia-class construction time to 60 months, extending the service life of some Los Angeles-class subs by up to two years, and lengthening some deployments from six months to seven months. If successful, all of these measures combined would result in the force bottoming out at 44 or 45 submarines.[19] Yet these stopgap efforts will merely succeed in maintaining a force more appropriate to the pre-9/11 moderate risk scenario.

Neglected ASW Capabilities. The declining SSN force poses a challenge not only to the Navy's ability to maintain effective underwater deterrence, but also to the Navy's ASW efforts, which are already suffering from declining numbers of other ASW platforms.[20] The Navy has 173 aging P-3C patrol aircraft,[21] and the P-8A (the P-3C's replacement) is not scheduled to begin entering service until 2013. The Navy is also retiring the S-3B Viking, its only long-range carrier-based ASW aircraft, and has no plans to replace it.[22]

In addition, "[t]he Navy lacks a modern equivalent of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), the theater-wide acoustic detection system developed in the 1950s to detect Soviet submarines."[23] This is emblematic of broader weaknesses. Many systems deployed during the Cold War are of limited usefulness in today's threat environment. For example, fixed sensors used during the Cold War are not located in areas where conflict is most likely to occur this century. Furthermore, more countries are deploying advanced submarines that could threaten U.S. aircraft carriers, raising the stakes of U.S. military intervention.

Navy force structure must adapt to this evolving underwater threat environment. In July 2008, Navy officials testified before Congress about prioritizing relevant naval combat capability and recent developments that significantly changed how they view current threats. Vice Admiral Barry McCullough described the Navy's new perception of the threat environment:

Rapidly evolving traditional and asymmetric threats continue to pose increasing challenges to Combatant Commanders. State actors and non-state actors who, in the past, have only posed limited threats in the littoral are expanding their reach beyond their own shores with improved capabilities in blue water submarine operations, advanced anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. A number of countries who historically have only possessed regional military capabilities are investing in their Navy to extend their reach and influence as they compete in global markets. Our Navy will need to outpace other navies in the blue water ocean environment as they extend their reach. This will require us to continue to improve our blue water anti-submarine and anti-ballistic missile capabilities in order to counter improving anti-access strategies.[24]

The Navy has acknowledged its atrophying ASW capabilities in the face of "a re-emerging undersea threat" and has set the goal of developing more advanced sensors and anti-submarine weapons in the coming years.[25] The U.S. Pacific Fleet has reportedly already increased ASW training.[26] These are critical efforts that must be sustained alongside a goal to increase the procurement of additional ASW platforms--primarily submarines and long-range maritime surveillance aircraft.

China. Since the end of the Cold War, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of the People's Republic of China has dramatically expanded and upgraded its navy, especially its submarine fleet, which is "now considered the PLAN's most 'potent strength.'"[27] According to the Pentagon, China has the largest naval force in Asia,[28] including 60 attack submarines (six SSNs and 54 diesel attack submarines).[29] More than half of its diesel submarines are the more modern Kilo-class, Song-class, and Yuan-class submarines.[30] One observer has noted that "China now has more submarines than Russia, and the speed [at which] they are building them is amazing."[31]

Submarine Fleet Expansion. China is well on its way to achieving its goal of building a credible blue-water navy that can project power well beyond its shores:

In order to grasp the energy that China is now committing to undersea warfare, consider that during 2002-2004 China's navy launched thirteen submarines while simultaneously undertaking the purchase of submarines from Russia on an unprecedented scale. Indeed, China commissioned thirty-one new submarines between 1995 and 2005. Given this rapid evolution, appraisals of China's capability to field competent and lethal diesel submarines in the littorals have slowly changed from ridicule to grudging respect of late. China's potential for complex technological development is finally being taken seriously abroad.[32]

Estimates of the future size of China's attack submarine fleet vary widely from 58 boats to 88 boats,[33] depending on how quickly older submarines are retired from service, whether building more expensive SSNs will reduce total submarine production, and additional purchases of foreign-built submarines. In recent years, China has introduced four new classes of domestically designed and built submarines: Jin or Type 094 (SSBN), Shang or Type 093 (SSN), Yuan or Type 041/039A (SSP), and Song or Type 039/039G (SSK). A successor to the Shang-class is reportedly in development.[34] This degree of sustained investment in submarine development and building suggests that the upper end of the range (possibly 70 or more) is a more realistic estimate of PLAN force structure in the coming decades.

Increased Patrols. The Chinese attack submarine fleet has noticeably increased its patrol rate from two patrols in 2006 to six in 2007 to 12 in 2008.[35] This suggests a new focus on training and a desire to demonstrate to other actors, particularly the United States, that China is a maritime power in the Pacific. Two recent incidents highlight this trend. On October 26, 2006, a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced within five miles of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk--inside its screen of escorts--which was operating near Okinawa.[36] On June 11, 2009, a Chinese submarine collided with the USS John S. McCain's towed sonar array off the Philippines.[37] Whatever these incidents may or may not reveal about the limitations of U.S. ASW capabilities and the competence of Chinese submariners[38]--the most useful information is almost certainly classified--they clearly demonstrate that China's submarines are ranging farther afield and operating more aggressively than in the past.

Objectives.A number of considerations and objectives could help to explain China's rapid expansion of its attack submarine fleet: basic Chinese defense needs, limiting the U.S. ability to "interfere" in China-Taiwan relations, challenging U.S. dominance in the Pacific, protecting the Chinese SSBN nuclear deterrent, and winning greater international prestige.

First, the bulk of China's wealth and population is concentrated on its east coast, which gives China a compelling reason to deploy a robust naval deterrent along that coast.

Alternatively, many security experts argue that "China's main objective in upgrading its submarine fleet is the ability to delay or deter a United States intervention on behalf of Taiwan."[39] China has been bedeviled by the "renegade province" of Taiwan and by U.S. meddling (from China's perspective) in cross-strait relations since 1949. When relations across the Taiwan Strait became particularly tense in 1996, the U.S. sent two carrier battle groups to the area to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Unsurprisingly, China has since placed a high priority on developing sea denial capabilities that could discourage and, if necessary, delay or prevent U.S. military intervention in a future cross-strait dispute.[40] The U.S. Department of Defense has concluded that, "Acquisition and development of the Kilo, Song, Shang, and Yuan-class submarines illustrates the importance the PLA places on undersea warfare for sea denial."[41]

The PLAN may also be emulating Soviet naval strategy, which "rapidly overcame the [Soviet Union's] unfavorable geostrategic situation" by using nuclear submarines to give it "an ocean-going navy with offensive capability."[42] A similar strategy would help the PLAN to break the "island chain blockade" of mainland China. The new naval base on Hainan Island adds an additional wrinkle, giving the PLAN "direct access to vital international sea lanes, and offer[ing] the potential for stealthy deployment of submarines into the deep waters of the South China Sea."[43]

As part of its nuclear deterrent, China is expected to build as many as five Jin-class SSBN submarines, each armed with 12 SLBMs capable of reaching U.S. territory from positions off the Chinese coast. This would constitute a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.[44] China may want to use some of its SSNs to escort SSBN deterrence patrols.[45]

Finally, it seems clear that China intends to become a global power, and "it appears to be conventional wisdom in the PRC that nuclear submarines represent one of China's clearest claims to status as a great power."[46] A strong attack submarine fleet would also help to protect Chinese shipping around the world. The Yin He incident in 1993 helped to solidify this concern among PRC leaders, who were "extremely furious, but had no recourse" when the U.S. insisted on inspecting a Chinese freighter suspected of carrying ingredients of chemical weapons to Iran.[47]

Australia. Australia has six diesel-electric submarines and has announced plans to replace them as part of a broader naval modernization program with 12 modern conventional submarines armed with cruise missiles.[48] The Australian government has explicitly tied this expansion to the rise of China as a naval power and weakening U.S. naval supremacy,[49] which Australia believes has "played a stabilizing role across the world and especially so in the Asia-Pacific region."[50]

India. While geographically not a Pacific country, India exercises growing influence in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific. India has 16 diesel-powered attack submarines and recently launched its first SSN, which is based on the Russian Akula-class. India will lease a second Akula-class submarine from Russia and is building six Scorpene-class diesel submarines.[51]

India's planned expansion and upgrade of its submarine fleet is part of a larger effort to add more than 100 warships to the Indian navy over 10 years. The Indian Ministry of Defense explains the shipbuilding program as a "strategic necessity" of national defense, largely in terms of countering the Chinese naval buildup: "China is developing its navy at a great rate. Its ambitions in the Indian Ocean are quite clear."[52] India also aspires to become a great power, and submarines are seen as an integral part of any major power's fleet.

Russia. The Russian (formerly Soviet) submarine fleet shrank by almost two-thirds after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In recent years, the Russian navy has emerged from its post-Soviet crisis, but still needs to decommission dozens of nuclear submarines left over from the Cold War. In 2009, Russia had 17 SSNs and 20 diesel submarines, of which five SSNs and nine diesel submarines were assigned to the Pacific fleet.[53] Despite massive budget increases in recent years, "the navy is haunted by insufficient funding, which limits its ability to conduct regular overhauls of operational submarines and even to maintain them in a combat-ready state."[54]

Japan. Japan maintains a modern submarine fleet of at least 16 boats, including at least one new Soryu-class AIP submarine.[55] Japan has historically replaced its submarines after about 16 years of service, much more quickly than other countries retire theirs.[56]

South Korea. South Korea has 12 attack submarines and plans to increase its fleet to 27 by 2020.[57]

North Korea. North Korea has 22 old conventional attack submarines (how many are serviceable is unknown) and numerous mini-submarines.[58] While its submarines could theoretically threaten merchant shipping and unsophisticated naval combatants,[59] North Korea's submarines are not viewed as serious contenders in sea control operations.

Taiwan. Taiwan operates two attack submarines and has explored numerous options to expand and upgrade its submarine fleet, including domestic construction. In 2001, the U.S. offered Taiwan an arms package that included eight diesel-electric submarines, but the U.S. does not own the rights to any current diesel submarine designs, and the proposal appears to be dead.[60]

Southeast Asia. In the context of China and India deploying nuclear-powered submarines, most countries in Southeast Asia are expanding or upgrading their existing submarine fleets. Indonesia has two submarines and has announced a plan to build 12 submarines by 2024.[61] Vietnam has ordered six Kilo-class submarines from Russia.[62] Singapore has recently acquired two Archer-class AIP submarines to replace two of its four aging boats.[63] In October 2007, Malaysia received delivery of its first submarine, a Scorpene-class boat built in France. The second is scheduled for delivery in 2010.[64] Thailand has no submarines, but has expressed increasing interest in acquiring several.[65]

Sustaining U.S. Undersea Supremacy

Over the past 16 years, China has rapidly expanded its submarine fleet while the U.S. has steadily drawn down its submarine forces even as combatant commanders have demanded more of their capabilities. U.S. allies and friends have expressed legitimate concerns about the shifting security environment in the Pacific.

The U.S. has acknowledged this shifting balance--at least in part--and has begun to address it. The Navy appears to be on course to fulfilling the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review directive to deploy 60 percent of the U.S. submarine fleet in the Pacific,[66] but deploying a higher percentage of a shrinking fleet will likely prove less effective than increasing the total number of submarines.

To halt and eventually reverse the erosion of U.S. undersea supremacy in the Pacific Ocean, to reassure and support U.S. allies, and to protect long-standing U.S. interests in the region, the U.S. should:

  • Build additional attack submarines more rapidly. Congress should increase procurement of Virginia-class submarines to at least two per year with the objective of fielding a force of at least 60 fast attack submarines.[67] Yet by itself, procuring new boats at the rate of two per year will not replace the Los Angeles-class submarines as quickly as they are scheduled to be decommissioned.
  • Overhaul and modernize selected Los Angeles-class submarines to extend their service life. While overhauling and modernizing submarines will require additional funding, extending the service life of older submarines that are still in good condition--instead of decommissioning them as planned--would help to close the "sub gap" over the short term at a lower cost than drastically increasing submarine construction.
  • Forward-base more submarines. Basing more submarines in Guam, Hawaii, and possibly Japan--in addition to the three SSNs already based in Guam--would place them closer to East Asia, where their services are most likely to be needed, and would allow them to maximize time on station and minimize travel time to and from their home ports.[68] The Navy should also consider acquiring additional submarine tenders, which would allow the creation of temporary forward bases where submarines could rotate crews and rearm.
  • Reevaluate the use of diesel submarines. Congress should direct the Navy to study the utility of using AIP attack submarines to help to close the gap between regional commander requirements and the number of available U.S. submarines. In the short term, as domestic production capabilities develop, the U.S. could buy submarines from U.S. allies.[69] Developing a U.S. conventional submarine capability would also facilitate more robust ASW training and afford the U.S. the option to sell advanced diesel submarines to Taiwan.
  • Research, develop, and deploy undersea force multipliers. Fielding unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) can enhance the range, capabilities, and lethality of existing undersea weapons, platforms, and sensors.[70] However, UUVs should not be viewed as replacements for attack submarines. The U.S. will need to continue deploying manned submarines for the foreseeable future while upgrading and enhancing their capabilities to counter developing and potential threats.
  • Enhance anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Atrophied U.S. ASW capabilities are particularly worrisome because developing skilled ASW personnel requires years of intensive training. Congress should allocate sufficient and stable funding to increase ASW capabilities both qualitatively and quantitatively. Specifically, Congress should increase the number of ASW platforms by expanding and accelerating the P-8 program and by building more ships with ASW capabilities, including more DDG-1000 destroyers or upgraded DDG-51s with towed sonar arrays.[71]
  • Work with the militaries of U.S. allies and friends to improve their submarine and ASW capabilities. These efforts should include more frequent and intensive multilateral exercises and maneuvers, technology sharing, and joint planning. Strengthening the capacity and capabilities of friendly foreign navies would allow the U.S. to employ fewer of its own resources in certain contingencies and missions, thereby freeing up U.S. submarines for other pressing needs.
  • Encourage greater Chinese transparency in security matters through military-to-military channels. Greater Chinese transparency about its military may resolve or ease some of the concerns about China's naval buildup. Greater understanding may also help to prevent or defuse future incidents involving the U.S. and Chinese militaries. China's failure to give prior notice to the U.S. military of its recent missile defense test--contrary to common international practice--weakens transparency efforts and leads to many unanswered questions.

Conclusion

The shifting security environment in the Pacific Ocean and East Asia has caused serious concern among U.S. allies and friends. Several have responded by launching aggressive naval buildups, and Australia has openly tied its defense buildup to the shifting China-U.S. balance in the Pacific.

The U.S. Navy is still the most powerful navy in the world, and it has the best-trained and most capable submarine force, but its declining numbers have been stretched thin by the demands of ongoing operations and other assigned missions. The continuing decline of the U.S. submarine fleet, in particular, threatens U.S. undersea supremacy in the Pacific and therefore could seriously undermine the Navy's ability to operate effectively in East Asia and the Pacific.

Unless the U.S. rebuilds its submarine fleet and enhances the Navy's ASW capabilities, U.S. military superiority in the Pacific will continue to wane, leading to avoidable political and economic hazards for the U.S. and its friends and allies.

Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Jon Rodeback is Research Editor at The Heritage Foundation. Julia I. Bertelsmann, a Research Assistant in the Allison Center, assisted in researching and writing this paper.

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MK 60 Encapsulated Torpedo (CAPTOR)

원본출처 미국과학자연맹 http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/mk60.htm
The Mk 60 CAPTOR is the US Navy's only deep water mine. The MK-60 CAPTOR, one of the Navy's primary anti submarine weapons, is actually a deepwater moored torpedo launcher. Mine Mk 60 is a sophisticated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) moored mine which is designed to detect and classify submarines and release a modified Torpedo Mk 46 to acquire and attack submerged targets only. This deep water mine is designed to be laid by aircraft or submarine, and is anchored to the ocean floor. The mine utilizes an influence firing device and is able to classify passing submarines. Its acoustic detection system is designed to seek hostile submarines, ignoring surface craft and friendly submarine acoustic signatures. The weapon lies dormant until a target is detected, at which time the torpedo swims out of its capsule to attack and destroy its target. As in other mines, the Mk 60 incorporates an arming-delay. The MK-60 can be deployed by air, submarine, or surface ship.

This weapon was developed by the Mine Division of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, which is now located at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida. Because it can be converted to have some operational capability in littoral waters, a modification to CAPTOR is being considered as one of the options for the Littoral Sea Mine (LSM) program.

Specifications

Primary Function Air and ship-launched lightweight torpedo
Contractor Alliant Techsystems
Power Plant Two-speed, reciprocating external combustion;
Mono-propellant (Otto fuel II) fueled
Length 102.36 in. tube launch configuration (from ship) 145 inches (368 centimeters) - Aircraft / Ship laid
132 inches (335 centimeters) Submarine laid
Diameter 12.75 inches
21 inches (53 centimeters) Aircraft / Ship laid
21 inches (53 centimeters) Submarine laid
Weight 517.65 lbs (warshot configuration)
2370 pounds (1077 kilograms) Air / Ship laid
2056 pounds (935 kilograms) Submarine laid
Range 8,000 yards
Depth Greater than 1,200 ft (365.76 meters)
Officially: "Up to 3000 feet (914 meters)"
Speed Greater than 28 knots (32.2 mph, 51.52 kph)
Detection System Reliable acoustic path (RAP) sound propagation
Guidance System Homing mode - Active or passive/active acoustic homing
Launch/search mode - Snake or circle search
Warhead 98 lbs. of PBXN-103 high explosive (bulk charge)
Date Deployed 1979

 


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북한은 동해안 신천, 문천등에 해군기지를 운영하고 있으며 특히 이들 기지에서는 수륙양용으로 이동가능한
호버크래프트를 운용하고 있습니다

2003년 4월 5일 촬영된 위성사진을 보면 신천해군기지에 호버크래프트가 정박된 모습을 볼 수 있습니다
숫자를 세어봤더니 위성으로 판별가능한 호버크래프트가 모두 16대였습니다

2007년 12월 4일 촬영된 위성사진을 보면 문천해군기지에는 호버크래프트가 정박 가능한 해안이 보이지만
호버크래프트를 볼 수는 없었습니다

신천해군기지 호버크래프트 좌표는 39 23 07 16 / 127 28 33 00 입니다


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천안함 침몰한 하루 뒤인 지난달 27일 해양경찰청이 수색작업 중 천암함의 함미로 추정되는 물체를 발견해 해군에 알렸다고 KBS가 4일 보도했다.
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/04/04/2010040400992.html?Dep1=news&Dep2=headline1&Dep3=h1_01_rel01
이 방송은 해경이 이날 사고 해역 수색 작업 중 수심 45m 해저에서 사각형 금속성 물체를 탐지, 천안함 함미로 판단하고 즉시 해군에 통보했다고 전했다. 해경 고위 관계자는 “수심이 일정하다가 갑자기 사각형을 올려놓은 것처럼 차이가 났다”며 “위치는 물론 수심측정기를 통해 나타난 그래프도 해군 측에 보내줬다”고 밝혔다. 해군이 해경의 위치 통보에 어떻게 대응했는지는 알려지지 않았다. 

해군이 어선의 도움을 받아 천안함 함미의 위치를 확인한 것은 28일 밤이었다. 해경이 해군에 통보한 금속성 물체의 위치가 해군이 하루 뒤 발견한 함미 위치와 일치한다고 KBS는 전했다. 해경의 통보를 받고 즉각 대응했다면 한발 빠른 구조 작업도 가능했을 것이라는 지적이다.

해경이 함미의 위치를 알려 주었는지 여부에 대해 군 당국은 확인해 줄 수 없다고 밝혔다고 KBS는 전했다.

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S. Korean ship obscured by murky sea conditions

Ashley Rowland / S&S
U.S. Navy personnel in a raft Saturday check the waters near a South Korean salvage ship, in the background, at the site of the wreckage of the South Korea patrol ship Cheonan,which sank on March 26 after an explosion. Purchase reprint
Ashley Rowland / S&S
Crew members of the USS Curtis Wilbur wait for the arrival of a helicopter on Saturday. The Curtis Wilbur is one of four U.S. ships standing by to assist in a rescue efforts to get to 46 South Korean sailors missing after the South Korean ship Cheonan sank on March 26. Most of the South Korean and U.S. ships at the wreckage site are also there as a deterrent to nearby North Korea, according to the U.S. Navy officer in charge of the American forces there. Purchase reprint
Ashley Rowland / S&S
Sailors on the USS Curtis Wilbur on Saturday drop a ladder to passengers waiting in a raft below. Purchase reprint
Ashley Rowland / S&S
Capt. Charlie Williams, commodore of Destroy Squadron 15 Purchase reprint

ABOARD THE USNS SALVOR, Yellow Sea — Clear skies and a billowing sea Saturday were not telling of what was beneath the surface: brutally strong currents, frigid temperatures, and water so murky that divers would barely be able see in front of them if they had to go in.

Those conditions, U.S. Navy divers and officials aboard this rescue and salvage ship said, are expected to persist and will make salvaging the wreckage of the South Korean patrol ship Cheonan that mysteriously sank more than a week ago unusually difficult.

“This is a very challenging dive scene,” said Capt. Charlie Williams, commodore of Destroyer Squadron 15, operating out of Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan.

Since the explosion, South Korea had been reporting 46 sailors missing. However, South Korea’s military said Saturday that the body of a missing sailor was found, the first since 58 crewmembers of the Cheonan were rescued within hours of the explosion.

On Saturday, The Associated Press reported that South Korea’s military ended its underwater search for the missing sailors. Families of the sailors asked the military to suspend the operation for fear of casualties among divers.

Media reports also said the body of a fisherman aboard a South Korean trawler was recovered Saturday but eight others were missing after the boat collided with a freighter Friday night.

Military efforts, however, remain focused on the Cheonan’s wreckage.

The 1,200-ton patrol ship sank at 9:22 p.m. on March 26 after an explosion split it in half near the maritime border between South and North Korea. Officials confirmed 45 crewmembers remained missing as of late Saturday, and they believe many were trapped inside the stern’s dining hall and bunking areas. If those sailors survived the explosion and were able to seal off the rooms where they were trapped, defense officials said, their air supply was expected to have run out on March 29; divers have pumped air into a crack on the stern of the ship, according to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Officials still do not know what caused the explosion, and South Korea and the U.S. have said there’s no indication that North Korea was involved. Yet, South Korea’s defense minister speculated Friday that a torpedo might have sunk the ship, after he told lawmakers earlier in the week that North Korea might have dispatched a mine to the area.

As of Saturday, four U.S. Navy ships and about 20 South Korean ships were at the wreckage site.

Williams said the U.S. forces are on hand to provide medical and safety assistance to South Korea, as well as force protection.

“That’s exactly why the other ships are here for — to provide that air defense and other capabilities that cruisers and destroyers have,” he said, referring to the Korean navy ships and the guided missile destroyers USS Curtis Wilbur and USS Lassen. The dock landing ship USS Harper’s Ferry, out of Sasebo Naval Base, Japan, arrived Friday.

Sailors aboard the Salvor and Curtis Wilbur said Saturday was the first day of good weather they had seen since arriving last weekend.

The water temperature — a bone-chilling 42 degrees on Saturday — and lack of visibility were expected to remain problems for divers and limit the time they could spend in the water.

Williams said he did not know when that would be, but the U.S. would be “using all capabilities” during the salvage of the sunken ship and the recovery of any bodies trapped inside.

A 16-member U.S. rescue and salvage dive team and a six-member underwater explosive ordnance disposal team are at the site. The EOD team would dive first into the wreckage to ensure any munitions aboard are stable.

During the salvage mission, the Salvor will anchor above the stern of the Cheonan, providing support and pumping air to divers in heavy, helmeted diving suits below, as well as communicating with them undersea.


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백령도해상에 침몰한 천안함에 대한 구조작업이 진행중인 가운데 오늘 북한 사곶기지에 대한 보도가 잇따랐습니다 
보도에 따르면 사곶기지는 백령도에서 50킬로 떨어진 북한 해군기지로 소형군함등은 물론 잠수함 20여척을 운용하는 기지라고 합니다 
또 신동아등에도 사곡기지에 대한 보도가 여러차례 있었으며 위치가 북위 37도49분2초, 동경 125도20분4초 일대라고 합니다 

이 좌표를 바탕으로 구글어스를 통해 사곶기지가 어떤 곳인지 살펴봤습니다 
구글거리측정결과 사곶기지는 백령도에서 동남쪽으로 약 50킬로미터, 천안함침몰해역지역에서는 약 39마일[약63킬로미터] 떨어진 지역이었습니다 
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=262&aid=0000003400


위 기사를 바탕으로 찬찬히 살펴봤습니다


사곶해군기지의 본진이라고 할 수 있는 1 지역[사곶해군기지로 표기]에는 주거용 건물들이 지어져 있으며 긴 부두가 있었습니다 줄지어 늘어선 주거용 건물들이 백채를 훨씬 넘는 것으로 미뤄 기지 규모가 적지 않음을 짐작케 합니다
2번 지역은 대공포 설치 지역, 3번 지역은 1번지역에서 직선거리로 약 1.9킬로미터 떨어져 있으며 도크2개와 긴 부두가
있었습니다
1번지역 부두의 길이를 재어본 결과 4백미터 였습니다
부두에 군데 군데 함정들이 줄지어 정박해 있었고 가장 큰 함정이 길이가 40미터 정도였습니다 
  

1번지역 부두우측에도 수리시설로 보이는 도크에 배 5-6척이 있었고 우측을 따라서 군데 군데 군함들이 많이 있었으며
해상에도 10여대가 한데 모여있는등 60-70척은 족히 되겠다는 생각이 들었습니다


2번지역은 사곶해군기지 가장 서쪽지역의 돌출부로 자세히 보면 구멍 6-7개가 보입니다
이안에 대공포가 숨겨져 있다고 합니다


다음 3번지역은 1번에서 직선거리로 1.9킬로미터 떨어진 조그만 섬에 대형 도크 2개와 긴 부두가 자리잡고 있었습니다
도크는 각각 백20미터 길이였고 부두 전체길이는 1번부두와 마찬가지로 4백미터였습니다


또 1번지역 부두에서 북방으로 약 1.1마일 떨어진 지점에 작은 터널이 하나 있었습니다 육안식별이 거의 힘들 정도입니다


또 언론에 보도된데로 3번 도크에서 3백20미터 좌측에 4번 작은 연못모양의 만이 있어서 40미터급 군함 3-4척이 그 안쪽에
피항할 수 있었습니다 특이한 것은 그 작은 연못모양의 만 안쪽에 지하동굴입구로 추정되는 5번사각모양의 입구가 보였습니다
지하동굴입구라면 소형군함 한척이 드나들수 있을 정도의 크기 였습니다
이 기지에서 잠수함 20여척이 운용된다는 합니다만 잠수함특성상 잘 찾을 수 없었습니다  


서해상 휴전선 바로 코앞에 이렇게 엄청난 규모의 북한 해군기지가 있으니 서해는 일촉즉발의 바다라는 생각이 듭니다
샤프 주한미군사령관의 언급처럼 북한이 서해지역의 해군전력을 크게 강화시켰다고 하니 우리도 특단의 대책을 세워야 할 
것입니다. 아마 공개되지는 않았지만 우리 군도 적절한 대응책을 세웠으리라 믿습니다