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분류없음2013.12.16 19:37
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http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nsa-speaks-out-on-snowden-spying/

NSA speaks out on Snowden, spying

The NSA gives unprecedented access to the agency's HQ and, for the first time, explains what it does and what it says it doesn't do: spy on Americans

2013 Dec 16

Correspondent John Miller

The following is a script from "Inside the NSA" which aired on Dec. 15, 2013. John Miller is the correspondent. Ira Rosen and Gabrielle Schonder, producers.

No U.S. intelligence agency has ever been under the kind of pressure being faced by the National Security Agency after details of some of its most secret programs were leaked by contractor Edward Snowden. Perhaps because of that pressure the agency gave 60 Minutes unprecedented access to NSA headquarters where we were able to speak to employees who have never spoken publicly before.

Full disclosure, I once worked in the office of the director of National Intelligence where I saw firsthand how secretly the NSA operates. It is often said NSA stands for "never say anything," but tonight the agency breaks with that tradition to address serious questions about whether the NSA delves too far into the lives of Americans.

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Alexander's Office

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Gen. Keith Alexander: The fact is, we're not collecting everybody's email, we're not collecting everybody's phone things, we're not listening to that. Our job is foreign intelligence and we're very good at that.

The man in charge is Keith Alexander, a four-star Army general who leads the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command.

John Miller: There is a perception out there that the NSA is widely collecting the content of the phone calls of Americans. Is that true?

"The fact is, we're not collecting everybody's email, we're not collecting everybody's phone things, we're not listening to that. Our job is foreign intelligence and we're very good at that."

Gen. Keith Alexander: No, that's not true. NSA can only target the communications of a U.S. person with a probable cause finding under specific court order. Today, we have less than 60 authorizations on specific persons to do that.

John Miller: The NSA as we sit here right now is listening to a universe of 50 or 60 people that would be considered U.S. persons?

Gen. Keith Alexander: Less than 60 people globally who are considered U.S. persons.

But the NSA doesn’t need a court order to spy on foreigners, from its heavily protected headquarters in Fort Meade, Md., it collects a mind-numbing amount of data from phones and the Internet. They sort through it all looking for clues to terrorist plots, and intelligence on the intentions of foreign governments. To do all that they use a network of supercomputers that use more power than most mid-sized cities.

Gen. Alexander agreed to talk to us because he believes, the NSA has not told its story well.

Gen. Keith Alexander: "We need to help the American people understand what we're doing and why we're doing it." And to put it simply, we're doing two things: We're defending this country from future terrorist attacks and we're defending our civil liberties and privacy. There's no reason that we would listen to the phone calls of Americans. There’s no intelligence value in that. There's no reason that we'd want to read their email. There is no intelligence value in that.

What they are doing is collecting the phone records of more than 300 million Americans.

John Miller: Then why do you need all of those phone records?

Gen. Keith Alexander: How do you know when the bad guy who's using those same communications that my daughters use, is in the United States trying to do something bad? The least intrusive way of doing that is metadata.

Metadata has become one of the most important tools in the NSA’s arsenal. Metadata is the digital information on the number dialed, the time and date, and the frequency of the calls. We wanted to see how metadata was used at the NSA. Analyst Stephen Benitez showed us a technique known as “call chaining” used to develop targets for electronic surveillance in a pirate network based in Somalia.

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Stephen Benitez: As you see here, I'm only allowed to chain on anything that I've been trained on and that I have access to. Add our known pirate. And we chain him out.

John Miller: Chain him out, for the audience, means what?

Stephen Benitez: People he's been in contact to for those 18 days.

Stephen Benitez: One that stands out to me first would be this one here. He's communicated with our target 12 times.

Stephen Benitez: Now we’re looking at Target B’s contacts.

John Miller: So he's talking to three or four known pirates?

Stephen Benitez: Correct. These three here. We have direct connection to both Target A and Target B. So we'll look at him, too, we'll chain him out. And you see, he's in communication with lots of known pirates. He might be the missing link that tells us everything.

John Miller: What happens in this space when a number comes up that's in Dallas?

Stephen Benitez: So If it does come up, normally, you'll see it as a protected number-- and if you don't have access to it, you won't be able to look.

If a terrorist is suspected of having contacts inside the United States, the NSA can query a database that contains the metadata of every phone call made in the U.S. going back five years.

John Miller: So you understand then, there might be a little confusion among Americans who read in the newspaper that the N.S.A. has vacuumed up, the records of the telephone calls of every man, woman and child in the United States for a period of years-- that sounds like spying on Americans.

Gen. Keith Alexander: Right, and that's wrong. That's absolutely wrong.

John Miller: You don’t hear the call?

Gen. Keith Alexander: You don't hear the call.

John Miller: You don't see the name.

Gen. Keith Alexander: You don't see the names.

John Miller: You just see this number, called that number.

Gen. Keith Alexander: The-- this number-- the "to/from" number, the duration of the call and date/time, that's all you get. And all we can do is tell the FBI, "That number is talking to somebody who is very bad, you ought to go look at it."

But privacy advocates argue American’s phone records should not sit in bulk at the NSA, searchable under a blanket court order. They believe the NSA should have to get a separate court order for each number and that the record should stay at the phone company.

John Miller: You get the bill from whatever the service provider is and you see who it's calling in America. You don't need to collect every American's phone numbers to do that.

Gen. Keith Alexander: Well, the reality is if you go and do a specific one for each, you have to tell the phone companies to keep those call detail records for a certain period of time. So, if you don’t have the data someplace you can’t search it. The other part that's important, phone companies-- different phone companies have different sets of records. And these phone calls may go between different phone companies. If you only go to one company, you'll see what that phone company has. But you may not see what the other phone company has or the other. So by putting those together, we can see all of that essentially at one time.

John Miller: Before 9/11, did we have this capability?

Gen. Keith Alexander: We did not.

John Miller: Is it a factor? Was it a factor?

Gen. Keith Alexander: I believe it was.

What Gen. Alexander is talking about is that two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi were in touch with an al Qaeda safe house in Yemen. The NSA did not know their calls were coming from California, as they would today.

Gen. Keith Alexander: I think this was the factor that allowed Mihdhar to safely conduct his plot from California. We have all the other indicators but no way of understanding that he was in California while others were in Florida and other places.

Edward Snowden revealed another program called “prism.” Which the NSA says is authorized under the foreign intelligence surveillance act, or FISA. Prism is the program the NSA uses to target the Internet communications of terrorists. It has the capability to capture emails, chats, video and photos. But privacy experts believe the NSA’s dragnet for terrorists on the Internet may also be sweeping up information on a lot of Americans.

Gen. Keith Alexander: No. That's not true. Under FISA, NSA can only target the communications of a U.S. person with a probable cause finding under specific court order.

John Miller: A judge in the FISA court, which is the court that secretly hears the NSA cases and approves or disapproves your requests. Said the NSA systematically transgressed both its own court-appointed limits in bulk Internet data collection programs.

Gen. Keith Alexander: There was nobody willfully or knowingly trying to break the law.

The NSA says their analysts use highly technical systems under increasingly complex legal requirements and that when mistakes are made, they’re human errors, not intentional abuses. The Snowden leaks have challenged the NSA officials to explain programs they never intended to talk about. So how did an obscure contractor and computer specialist, pull off the most damaging breach of secrets in U.S. history? Few have spent more time thinking about that than Rick Ledgett.

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John Miller: How long have you been with the NSA?

Rick Ledgett: For 25 years.

John Miller: How many television interviews have you done?

Rick Ledgett: One, this one.

Ledgett runs the NSA task force doing the damage assessment on the Snowden leaks. And until this interview, the NSA has never discussed the specifics of the extent damage they believe Snowden has done and still could do.

John Miller: There've been all kinds of figures out there about how much he took, how many documents. We've been told 1.7 million.

Rick Ledgett: I wouldn't dispute that.

John Miller: How is that possible?

Rick Ledgett: So, the people who control that, the access to those machines, are called system administrators and they have passwords that give them the ability to go around those-- security measures and that's what Snowden did.

Edward Snowden worked for the NSA in Hawaii. Part of his job was to help maintain the NSA’s computers and also move large sets of data between different systems.

John Miller: Did he take everything he had access to, or was he a careful shopper?

Rick Ledgett: He did something that we call-- scraping. Where he went out and just went-- used tools to scrape information from websites, and put it into a place where he could download it.

John Miller: At some point you then understood the breadth of what was missing and what could be missing?

Rick Ledgett: Yes.

John Miller: Of all the things he took is there anything in there that worries you or concerns you more than anything else?

Rick Ledgett: It's an exhaustive list of the requirements that have been levied against-- against the National Security Agency. And what that gives is, what topics we're interested in, where our gaps are. But additional information about U.S. capabilities and U.S. gaps is provided as part of that.

John Miller: So, I'm going to assume that there's one in there about China, and there's one in there about Iran, and there's another in there about Russia.

Rick Ledgett: Many more than one.

John Miller: Many more than one?

Rick Ledgett: Yes.

John Miller: How many of those are there?

Rick Ledgett: About 31,000.

John Miller: If those documents fell into their hands? What good would it do them?

Rick Ledgett: It would give them a roadmap of what we know, what we don't know, and give them-- implicitly, a way to-- protect their information from the U.S. intelligence community's view.

John Miller: For an adversary in the intelligence game, that's a gold mine?

Rick Ledgett: It is the keys to the kingdom.

So far, none of those crucial documents have been leaked. In Hong Kong last June, Snowden claimed that exposing the secret programs of the NSA did not make him a traitor or a hero, but an American.

[Edward Snowden: The public needs to decide whether these programs or policies are right or wrong.]

Snowden who is believed to still have access to a million and a half classified documents he has not leaked. Has been granted temporary asylum in Moscow, which leaves the U.S. with few options.

John Miller: He's already said, "If I got amnesty I would come back," given the potential damage to national security, what would your thought on making a deal be?

Rick Ledgett: So, my personal view is, yes, it's worth having a conversation about. I would need assurances that the remainder of the data could be secured and my bar for those assurances would be very high. It would be more than just an assertion on his part.

John Miller: Is that a unanimous feeling?

Rick Ledgett: It's not unanimous.

Among those who think making a deal is a bad idea is Ledgett’s boss, Gen. Alexander.

Gen. Keith Alexander: This is analogous to a hostage taker taking 50 people hostage, shooting 10 and then say, "If you give me full amnesty I'll let the other 40 go." What do you do?

John Miller: It's a dilemma.

Gen. Keith Alexander: It is.

John Miller: Do you have a pick?

Gen. Keith Alexander: I do. I think people have to be held accountable for their actions.

Gen. Keith Alexander: Because what we don't want is the next person to do the same thing, race off to Hong Kong and to Moscow with another set of data knowing they can strike the same deal.

John Miller: This happened on your watch. A 20-something-year-old high school dropout contractor managed to walk out with in essence the crown jewels. Did you offer to resign about the Snowden incident?

Gen. Keith Alexander: Yes.

John Miller: The secretary of Defense, the director of National Intelligence, what did they say?

Gen. Keith Alexander: Well, I offered to resign. And they said, "We don't see a reason that you should resign. We haven't found anybody there doing anything wrong. In fact, this could have happened to anybody in the community. And we don't need you to resign. We need you and deputy director to help work your way through is," which is what we're doing. We'll do everything we can to fix it.

Besides Edward Snowden, Gen. Alexander has growing concerns about a number of increasing threats to the United States, and the NSA's ability to stop them. That part of the story when we come back.


The Snowden Affair

Inside the NSA, where getting hired requires swearing an oath to your country and signing a vow of secrecy under the penalty of law, the very concept of what Edward Snowden did was hard for many to grasp. Gen. Keith Alexander felt he had a big stake in understanding Snowden, so he and Rick Ledgett who runs the Snowden task force got on a plane to Hawaii. They wanted to see the scene of the crime, Edward Snowden's desk.


John Miller: Did you sit in his chair?

Rick Ledgett: I did not. I couldn’t bring myself to do that.

For Ledgett, the trip was important to understanding who Snowden was, and going back through the bits and the bytes, they discovered the first secrets Snowden stole, was how to cheat on a test to get a job at the agency.

Rick Ledgett: He was taking a technical examination for potential employment at NSA; he used his system administrator privileges to go into the account of the NSA employee who was administering that test, and he took both questions and the answers, and used them to pass the test.

At home, they discovered Snowden had some strange habits.

Rick Ledgett: He would work on the computer with a hood that covered the computer screen and covered his head and shoulders, so that he could work and his girlfriend couldn't see what he was doing.

John Miller: That's pretty strange, sitting at your computer kind of covered by a sheet over your head and the screen?

Rick Ledgett: Agreed.

We also learned for the first time, that part of the damage assessment considered the possibility that Snowden could have left a bug or virus behind on the NSA’s system, like a time bomb.

Rick Ledgett: So, all the machines that he had access to we removed from our classified network. All the machines in the unclassified network and including the actual cables that connect those machines, we removed as well.

John Miller: This has to have cost millions and millions of dollars.

Rick Ledgett: Tens of millions. Yes.

While Edward Snowden's leaks have been a disaster for the agency, the rest of the NSA’s mission has not slowed down.

[Meanwhile, the Pakistani government has asked the US government to relook its drone policy.]

Twice a week, under the dim blue lights of the NSA’s operations center, the director is given a briefing.

[Sir, we added three new hostage cases this week.]

With his deputy, Chris Inglis, Gen. Alexander listens to a rundown of global issues and international crisis the NSA may be asked to collect intelligence on.

[Sir, moving to Afghanistan.]

The meeting is called the stand-up because no one sits down, which is almost a metaphor for the pace of daily life in the NSA operations center. Howie Larrabee is the center’s director.

Howie Larrabee: This is a 24/7 operation center. We haven’t had a day off. We haven’t had a Christmas off. And we haven’t had a major snowstorm off in more than 40 years.

While the operation’s center grapples with terrorist plots and war zones, another team of analysts is monitoring what the agency says is the rising threat of a cyber attack that could take down anything from the power grid to Wall Street.

"This is a 24/7 operation center. We haven’t had a day off. We haven’t had a Christmas off. And we haven’t had a major snowstorm off in more than 40 years."

John Miller: Could a foreign country tomorrow topple our financial system?

Gen. Keith Alexander: I believe that a foreign nation could impact and destroy major portions of our financial system, yes.

John Miller: How much of it could we stop?

Gen. Keith Alexander: Well, right now it would be difficult to stop it because our ability to see it is limited.

One they did see coming was called the BIOS Plot. It could have been catastrophic for the United States. While the NSA would not name the country behind it, cyber security experts briefed on the operation told us it was China. Debora Plunkett directs cyber defense for the NSA and for the first time, discusses the agency’s role in discovering the plot.

Debora Plunkett: One of our analysts actually saw that the nation state had the intention to develop and to deliver, to actually use this capability-- to destroy computers.

John Miller: To destroy computers.

Debora Plunkett: To destroy computers. So the BIOS is a basic input, output system. It's, like, the foundational component firmware of a computer. You start your computer up. The BIOS kicks in. It activates hardware. It activates the operating system. It turns on the computer.

This is the BIOS system which starts most computers. The attack would have been disguised as a request for a software update. If the user agreed, the virus would’ve infected the computer.

John Miller: So, this basically would have gone into the system that starts up the computer, runs the systems, tells it what to do.

Debora Plunkett: That's right.

John Miller: --and basically turned it into a cinderblock.

Debora Plunkett: A brick.

John Miller: And after that, there wouldn't be much you could do with that computer.

Debora Plunkett: That's right. Think about the impact of that across the entire globe. It could literally take down the U.S. economy.

John Miller: I don't mean to be flip about this. But it has a kind of a little Dr. Evil quality-- to it that, "I'm going to develop a program that can destroy every computer in the world." It sounds almost unbelievable.

Debora Plunkett: Don't be fooled. There are absolutely nation states who have the capability and the intentions to do just that.

John Miller: And based on what you learned here at NSA. Would it have worked?

Debora Plunkett: We believe it would have. Yes.

John Miller: Is this anything that's been talked about publicly before?

Debora Plunkett: No, not-- not to this extent. This is the first time.

The NSA working with computer manufacturers was able to close this vulnerability, but they say there are other attacks occurring daily. So the NSA has hired 3,000 young analysts as part of cyberdefense.

Three of those analysts Morgan, Charles and Natalie describe to us how country's like China, Russia and Iran use social engineering to get inside a network.

John Miller: They're looking for a disguise to get in?

Charles: Exactly, yes.

John Miller: And at what point will they ask the question that will cause the adversary to hand over that vulnerability?

Morgan: So if I want to craft a social engineering message to lure you in so that I could potentially steal your username and password to gain access to a network, I may go on your Facebook page and see if you like golfing. So if you like golfing, then maybe I'm gonna send you a email about-- you know, a sale at a big golf retailer near you.

John Miller: So you're trying to develop that little box that's irresistible--

Voices: Correct, Uh-huh.

John Miller: --that the person has to click on and open, because--

Morgan: They'll take, yeah.

John Miller: --they need to see what's inside?

Morgan: Right.

John Miller: And that is going to let loose all the gremlins that are going to take over whatever they're capable of taking over.

Morgan: Yeah, that's their door in.

Charles: The other real trick is, it's not necessarily one email. It could be 50 emails. In the new cyber paradigm, you can fail 50 times. You can ignore 50 emails. But if that 51st one is clicked, then that's it. Game over.

But before computers, before phones, there were codes. The NSA was born out of the codebreakers of World War II. And even today, the most secret room inside the most secret building at the NSA is called the black chamber. This is where the nation’s top codebreakers work. We were able to look inside, but for obvious reasons, the NSA asked us not to show the people who worked there.

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The Black Chamber CBS News

Outside the black chamber is this ordinary-looking file cabinet. But it can only be opened with a code known by a handful of people. Bob, who watches over it, explains it holds the records of every code America has broken over the last 60 years.

John Miller: If I was Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, would I want what was inside there?

Bob: You would be greatly interested in what’s in this box.

Bob: This would be the ark of the covenant.

When you walk around the NSA research building, where the codebreakers work, you see some very young people. And very smart people.

John Miller: How long would it take you to do this?

Joe: About a minute.

John Miller: Are you serious?

Joe: Yeah

John Miller: Go.

Many of the cryptologists skipped grades in school, earned masters degrees and PhDs and look more like they belong on a college campus than at the NSA.

Actually, the Rubik’s cube took him one minute and 35 seconds.

John Miller: You know, I didn't like you before.

For this group, the Rubik’s cube was the easiest problem that day.

Joslyn: So the idea here is we’re looking at a sequence of numbers, and we want to determine whether they’re random or not random.

John Miller: How are you approaching that? Can you show me?

Joe: We are looking at this data here and it is a bunch of random numbers on the screen.

John Miller: That looks a tad overwhelming.

Joe: It is.

John Miller: Can you actually imagine solving this?

Joe: We solve hard problem all the time.

John Miller: Is there an unbreakable code?

Chris Inglis: Theoretically, yes. There’s always been an unbreakable code.

Chris Inglis is the former deputy director of the NSA. Among the areas he supervised, are the codebreakers. He says each summer 10,000 high school students apply for a few openings.

Chris Inglis: We clear them fully. We give them full access to our problems. We give them problems that we could not solve. And they solve some number of those problems. The principle reason being that they bring a different perspective and audacity to it that we hadn’t thought about in all the years of experience that we’ve brought to bear.

John Miller: So you’ve had occasions where you’ve given a difficult problem to a high school kid with a top-secret clearance whose come back and said “hey, I think I got this one?”

Chris Inglis: For any given summer that’s more often the rule than the exception. We’re always pleasantly surprised.

While high school kids on summer break may be cracking secret codes, this is still a spy agency that steals secrets, reads emails and listens to foreign leader’s phone calls.

Among the Snowden leaks, perhaps the most embarrassing for the White House was that the NSA monitored some of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone calls. But Gen. Alexander says the NSA doesn’t choose who to spy on. They target the subjects and the countries that other U.S. agencies including the State Department ask for intelligence on.

Gen. Keith Alexander: That's one of the ones that the White House and I think our principals are looking at. What is the appropriate measures? What should we do? And what are we gonna stop doing? From my perspective when we look at that it has to be both ways. Our country and their country has to come to an agreement to do the same. It can't be--

John Miller: Well--

Gen. Keith Alexander: --either way.

John Miller: --does that mean that we'll just agree to stop spying on everybody including our friends if they all agree to stop spying on everybody including us?

Gen. Keith Alexander: Well, I think that's gotta be part of the negotiation. And I think that's fraught with concern. What do you mean by--

John Miller: Do you think--

Gen. Keith Alexander: --"stop spying"?

John Miller: --Chancellor Merkel hears President Obama's calls?

Gen. Keith Alexander: Well, I don't know. But I know they have a great intelligence capability and that they collect foreign intelligence just like we do.

This week, the CEOs of eight major Internet providers including Google, Apple and Yahoo asked the president for new limits to be placed on the NSA’s ability to collect personal information from their users.

John Miller: One of the Snowden leaks involved the concept that NSA had tunneled into the foreign data centers of major U.S. Internet providers. Did the leak describe it the right way?

Gen. Keith Alexander: No, that's not correct. We do target terrorist communications. And terrorists use communications from Google, from Yahoo, and from other service providers. So our objective is to collect those communications no matter where they are.

But we're not going into a facility or targeting Google as an entity or Yahoo has an entity. But we will collect those communications of terrorists that flow on that network.

Sources tell 60 Minutes the president’s intelligence review panel will recommend new limits on bulk collection of U.S. phone records which concerns Gen. Alexander.

John Miller: After all of this controversy, you could come out of this with less authority than you went into it. What does that say?

Gen. Keith Alexander: Well, my concern on that is specially what's going on in the Middle East, what you see going on in Syria, what we see going on-- Egypt, Libya, Iraq, it's much more unstable, the probability that a terrorist attack will occur is going up. And this is precisely the time that we should not step back from the tools that we've given our analysts to detect these types of attacks.

© 2013 CBS Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved.

John Miller is a senior correspondent for CBS News, with extensive experience in intelligence, law enforcement and journalism, including stints in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the FBI.


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분류없음2013.11.28 08:03
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http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448

Top secret documents retrieved by U.S. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government allowed the largest American spy agency to conduct widespread surveillance in Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.

The documents are being reported exclusively by CBC News.

The briefing notes, stamped "Top Secret," show the U.S. turned its Ottawa embassy into a security command post during a six-day spying operation by the National Security Agency while U.S. President Barack Obama and 25 other foreign heads of state were on Canadian soil in June of 2010.

The covert U.S. operation was no secret to Canadian authorities.

An NSA briefing note describes the American agency's operational plans at the Toronto summit meeting and notes they were "closely co-ordinated with the Canadian partner."

The NSA and its Canadian "partner," the Communications Security Establishment Canada, gather foreign intelligence for their respective governments by covertly intercepting phone calls and hacking into computer systems around the world.

The secret documents do not reveal the precise targets of so much espionage by the NSA — and possibly its Canadian partner — during the Toronto summit.

But both the U.S. and Canadian intelligence agencies have been implicated with their British counterpart in hacking the phone calls and emails of foreign politicians and diplomats attending the G20 summit in London in 2009 — a scant few months before the Toronto gathering of the same world leaders.

hi-snowden-blog

Secret documents released by U.S. whistleblower Edward Snowden have provided new insight about the level of U.S. and Canadian spying on allies and foreign diplomats. (The Guardian/Associated Press)

Notably, the secret NSA briefing document describes part of the U.S. eavesdropping agency's mandate at the Toronto summit as "providing support to policymakers."

Documents previously released by Snowden, a former NSA contractor who has sought and received asylum in Russia, suggested that support at other international gatherings included spying on the foreign delegations to get an unfair advantage in any negotiations or policy debates at the summit.

It was those documents that first exposed the spying on world leaders at the London summit.

More recently, Snowden's trove of classified information revealed Canada's eavesdropping agency had hacked into phones and computers in the Brazilian government's department of mines, a story that touched off a political firestorm both in that country and in Ottawa.

The documents have rocked political capitals around the world. NSA spies on everyone from leaders of U.S. allies to millions of Americans. Personal information has been scooped up by the agency’s penetration of major internet and phone companies.

Economic and political espionage

The spying at the Toronto summit in 2010 fits a pattern of economic and political espionage by the powerful U.S. intelligence agency and its partners such as Canada.

That espionage was conducted to secure meeting sites and protect leaders against terrorist threats posed by al-Qaeda but also to forward the policy goals of the United States and Canada.

The G20 summit in Toronto had a lot on its agenda that would have been of acute interest to the NSA and Canada.

The world was still struggling to climb out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders were debating a wide array of possible measures including a global tax on banks, an idea strongly opposed by both the U.S. and Canadian governments. That notion was eventually scotched.

The secret NSA documents list all the main agenda items for the G20 in Toronto — international development, banking reform, countering trade protectionism, and so on — with the U.S. snooping agency promising to support "U.S. policy goals."

Whatever the intelligence goals of the NSA during the Toronto summit, international security experts question whether the NSA spying operation at the G20 in Toronto was even legal.

"If CSEC tasked NSA to conduct spying activities on Canadians within Canada that CSEC itself was not authorized to take, then I am comfortable saying that would be an unlawful undertaking by CSEC," says Craig Forcese, an expert in national security at University of Ottawa's faculty of law.

By law, CSEC cannot target anyone in Canada without a warrant, including world leaders and foreign diplomats at a G20 summit.

But, the Canadian eavesdropping agency is also prohibited by international agreement from getting the NSA to do the spying or anything that would be illegal for CSEC.

Canada's 'Five Eyes' partners

The NSA isn't Canada's only partner in the covert surveillance business.

They are part of a multinational partnership that includes sister organizations in the U.K., Australia and New Zealand — the so-called "Five Eyes."

CSEC has roughly 2,000 employees and an annual budget of about $450 million. It will soon move into a new Ottawa headquarters costing taxpayers more than $1.2 billion, the most expensive federal government building ever constructed.

By comparison, the NSA is the largest intelligence agency in the U.S., with a budget of over $40 billion and employing about 40,000 people. It is currently building what is believed to be one of the largest and most powerful computers in the world.

CSEC is comparatively much smaller but has become a formidable and sophisticated surveillance outlet. Canadian eavesdroppers are also integral to the Five Eyes partnership around the world.

The documents obtained by the CBC do not indicate what, if any, role CSEC played in spying at the G20 in Toronto.

But the briefing notes make it clear that the agency's co-operation would be absolutely vital to ensuring access to the telecommunications systems that would have been used by espionage targets during the summits.

G20 Report

A protester jumps on a burnt-out car as a police car burns in the background during an anti-G20 demonstration June 26, 2010 in Toronto. Top secret NSA briefing notes predicted vandalism by "issue-based extremists" was a more likely threat than al-Qaeda-type terrorists during the event. (Ryan Remiorz/Canadian Press)

Much of the secret G20 document is devoted to security details at the summit, although it notes: "The intelligence community assesses there is no specific, credible information that al-Qa'ida or other Islamic extremists are targeting" the event.

No matter. The NSA warns the more likely security threat would come from "issue-based extremists" conducting acts of vandalism.

They got that right.

Protest marches by about 10,000 turned the Toronto G20 into an historic melee of arrests by more than 20,000 police in what would become one of the largest and most expensive security operations in Canadian history.

By the time the tear gas had cleared and the investigations were complete, law enforcement agencies stood accused of mass-violations of civil rights.

Add to that dubious legacy illegal spying by an American intelligence agency with the blessing of the Canadian government.

CBC contacted the Canadian and U.S. governments for comment, and answers to specific questions.

U.S. State Department officials would not comment directly on the spying issue. Instead they pointed to the fact President Obama has ordered a review of all NSA operations in the wake of the Snowden revelations.

In Canada, officials at CSEC offered no comment .


분류없음2013.11.25 16:44
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NSA, 한일해저케이블등 전세계 20개 초고속광케이블망 집중감시 - NSA 세계신호정보감시망지도

NSA 세계신호정보 감시망 시크릿오브코리아 안치용.pdf

2013년 11월 23일 네덜란드신문 NRC 보도 


NSA 세계신호정보 감시망 시크릿오브코리아 안치용

분류없음2013.11.03 18:24
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NSA, 반기문-오바마 면담전 반기문 대화요점 도청 : 뉴욕타임스


2013/11/03 - [분류 전체보기] - NSA, 한국-프랑스-이스라엘 우방 3개국 집중감시 첫 확인:NSA 2007년 1월 미션리스트[비밀문서원문첨부]


2013/11/04 - [분류 전체보기] - 효성, 클린턴관련 미펀드에 거액비자금의혹-펀드파트너 알고보니 효성임원: 미 증권거래위원회및 한국전자공시시스템확인


When Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations secretary general, sat down with President Obama at the White House in April to discuss Syrian chemical weapons, Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and climate change, it was a cordial, routine exchange.

The National Security Agency nonetheless went to work in advance and intercepted Mr. Ban’s talking points for the meeting, a feat the agency later reported as an “operational highlight” in a weekly internal brag sheet. It is hard to imagine what edge this could have given Mr. Obama in a friendly chat, if he even saw the N.S.A.’s modest scoop. (The White House won’t say.)

중략



분류없음2013.11.03 14:56
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미 국가안보국 NSA가 중국,러시아등 미국의 적대국가뿐 아니라 한국과 프랑스, 이스라엘등 우방 3개국의 정보활동을 집중 감시했던 것으로 확인됐습니다



2013/11/04 - [분류 전체보기] - 효성, 클린턴관련 미펀드에 거액비자금의혹-펀드파트너 알고보니 효성임원: 미 증권거래위원회및 한국전자공시시스템확인


2013/11/03 - [분류 전체보기] - '10억대 조의금의혹' 최상화관장 부친집은 경남 사천인데 발인은 서울대 병원, 경찰은 길안내 - 이건 아니다. 사표내고 수사받아야 !!


미 국가안보국이 작성한 '2007년 1월 미국신호정보수집활동 미션리스트'라는 10페이지짜리의 비밀문서에 따르면 미국은 외국정보기관의 위험에 대한 대응, 즉 방첩활동으로 외국정보기관의 정보활동을 감시했으며 특히 한국과 프랑스, 이스라엘등 우방국 정보기관의 활동을 집중감시한다고 명시했습니다


특히 한국과 프랑스, 이스라엘의 정보활동에 대한 감시는 방첩활동중 '치명적으로 중요한 타켓'[FOCUS AREAS]으로 설정했음이 뉴욕타임스가 오늘 [현지시간 3일 일요일] 에드워드 스노든으로 부터 입수한 이 비밀문서를 통해 드러났습니다


신호수집정보활동, 즉 시진트는 도청등 전자감시장비를 통한 정보수집활동을 일컫는 것으로 이 문서는 한국등이 도청의 집중타켓임을 보여주는 것으로 풀이됩니다.


방첩활동중 '포크스 에리어즈'로 설정된 국가는 중국, 러시아, 쿠바, 이란, 파키스탄, 북한, 베네주엘라, 프랑스, 이스라엘, 한국등 10개국으로 이중 미국의 우방국가는 한국과 프랑스, 이스라엘등 3개국뿐이며 중국, 러시아등 7개 국가는 우방 3개국에 비해 상대적으로 미국과 적대적으로 평가되는 국가입니다


또 '포크스 에리어즈'보다 한등급이 낮은 전략적으로 중요한 타켓, 즉 '억셉티드 리스크스'에 해당되는 국가는 타이완과 사우디 아라비아등 2개국으로 밝혀졌습니다


특히 이 '포크스 에리어즈' 대상에 대한 정보수집활동은 MUST-DO, 즉 이유여하를 막론하고 '무조건 수행해야 한다'고 명시돼 있어 한국 정보기관의 활동에 대한 신호수집은 백% 수행됐을 것으로 추정됩니다.


미국에 주재하는 세계각국의 정보기관요원등에 대한 감시는 방첩활동으로서, 세계각국이 자국에 주재하는 타국의 외교관과 정보요원을 감시하는 것과 동일한 활동이지만 프랑스, 이스라엘은 물론 미국의 혈맹으로 간주되는 한국의 정보기관이 치명적으로 중요한 타켓으로 설정된 것은 충격이 아닐 수 없습니다


국가안보국은 이 문서는 향후 12개월에서 18개월까지의 미국 신호정보수집시스템, 즉 도청의 임무우선순위와 위협을 분석한 것이라고 밝혀 이 문서가 작성된 2007년 1월부터 짧게는 12개월, 길게는 2008년 중반까지 18개월간의 임무를 설정한 것으로 풀이됩니다


특히 이 문서는 지난 6월 30일 영국 가디언지가 국가안보국이 한국등 35개국 대사관을 도청했다고 보도했으나 해당문서는 공개되지 않는등 아직까지 한국이 명시된 국가안보국 비밀문서는 공개되지 않았으며 '신호정보수집 미션리스트'라는 이 비밀문서가 한국이 명백한 도청대상이었음을 입증하는 첫 문서입니다.


2013/11/03 - [분류 전체보기] - 무궁화위성 헐값매입 홍콩업체는 한국인소유업체 - 토마스 최사장등 등기이사 3명중 2명 한국인

2013/11/03 - [분류 전체보기] - KT, '무궁화 3호 12년 더 작동가능'알고도 헐값매각: KT-ABS,'12년운옹할 연료남았다 ' 공동발표문 전문


2013/11/03 - [분류 전체보기] - NSA, 반기문-오바마 면담전 반기문 대화요점 도청 : 뉴욕타임스




국가안보국은 또 한국의 전쟁등 유사시의 한반도작전계획인 이른바 '작계 5027'에 대한 한국지도자들의 견해나 의도와 관련한 신호정보도 집중수집한 것으로 드러났습니다


국가안보국은 비밀문서 4페이지에서 해외주둔 미군의 안전확보와 원할한 작전수행을 위해 한국과 관련한 작계 5027을 지원하는 신호정보수집을 치명적으로 중요한 타켓, 즉 포크스 에리어즈로 명시했습니다


또 전략적으로 중요한 타켓의 항목에 작계 5027에 대한 한국지도자들의 견해와 의도를 중요수집대상으로 꼽았습니다


이 계획이 작성된 2007년 1월은 노무현대통령 집권 마지막해였으며 노대통령은 집권이후 전시작전권 이양등을 추진했기 때문에 국가안보국의 타켓설정이 이와 관련됐을 것으로 추정됩니다


국가안보국은 또 한국이 정보기술강국임을 인지하고 한국의 첨단기술에 대해 깊은 관심을 갖고 그에 대한 신호정보도 집중수집한 것으로 확인됐습니다 


국가안보국은 이 문서 6페이지에서 '떠오르는 전략적 기술' 즉 군사, 경제, 정치적으로 중요한 의미를 지니는 '첨단기술'에 대한 정보수집을 중요임무로 설정하고 한국과 러시아, 중국, 인도, 일본, 독일, 프랑스, 이스라엘, 싱가폴, 스웨덴등 10개국에 대한 기술정보수집을 치명적으로 중요한 타켓으로 명시했습니다 


국가안보국은 첨단기술의 예로 레이저, 컴퓨터, 에너지 무기, 스텔스및 스텔스 탐지기술, 전자전 무기, 나노테크날러지등을 꼽았습니다 


국가안보국은 이 문서에서 미국의 신호정보수집활동의 임무를 주제별 미션과 인듀어링 타켓[지속적인 타켓]등 2개 부류로 나누고 주제별 미션은 다시 16가지 세부 임무, 인듀어링타켓[지속타켓]은 다시 6가지 세부임무로 분류한 것으로 확인됐습니다

 

또 임무의 중요성에 따라 포크스 에리어즈와 억셉티드 리스크스로 나눠서 해당임무의 우선순위를 정했습니다. 국가안보국은 이 문서에서 포그크 에리어즈[FOCUS AREAS]는 치명적으로 중요한 타겟[CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TARGETS]이며 억셉티드 리스크스[ACCEPTED RISKS]는 전략적으로 중요한 타켓[STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT TARGETS]이라고 정의했습니다


한국과 관련한 정보수집 즉, 정보기관대상, 해외주둔관련대상, 첨단기술관련대상등 3개 임무는 모두 주제별 미션에 포함돼 있습니다 


국가안보국은 이외에도 북한에 대한 신호정보수집에 역량을 집중했으며 북한은 주제별 미션 타켓이었을 뿐 아니라 지속적인 타켓범주에도 포함됐습니다 


특히 지속저인 타켓인 6개 국가중 북한은 중국에 이어 2번째 중요한 타켓으로 지목됐습니다. 인듀어링 타켓은 중국, 북한, 이라크, 이란, 러시아, 베네주엘라였습니다.



NSA 200701 미션 리스트 시크릿오브코리아 안치용.pdf


NSA 200701 미션 리스트 시크릿오브코리아 안치용.pdf


분류없음2013.10.30 16:52
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NSA infiltrates links to Yahoo, Google data centers worldwide, Snowden documents say

By Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, Wednesday, October 30, 12:19 PM

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_print.html

The National Security Agency has secretly broken into the main communications links that connect Yahoo and Google data centers around the world, according to documents obtained from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable officials.

By tapping those links, the agency has positioned itself to collect at will from among hundreds of millions of user accounts, many of them belonging to Americans. The NSA does not keep everything it collects, but it keeps a lot.

According to a top secret accounting dated Jan. 9, 2013, NSA’s acquisitions directorate sends millions of records every day from Yahoo and Google internal networks to data warehouses at the agency’s Fort Meade headquarters. In the preceding 30 days, the report said, field collectors had processed and sent back 181,280,466 new records — ranging from “metadata,” which would indicate who sent or received e-mails and when, to content such as text, audio and video.

The NSA’s principal tool to exploit the data links is a project called MUSCULAR, operated jointly with the agency’s British counterpart, GCHQ. From undisclosed interception points, the NSA and GCHQ are copying entire data flows across fiber-optic cables that carry information between the data centers of the Silicon Valley giants.

The infiltration is especially striking because the NSA, under a separate program known as PRISM, has front-door access to Google and Yahoo user accounts through a court-approved process.

The MUSCULAR project appears to be an unusually aggressive use of NSA tradecraft against flagship American companies. The agency is built for high-tech spying, with a wide range of digital tools, but it has not been known to use them routinely against U.S. companies.

White House officials and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which oversees the NSA, declined to confirm, deny or explain why the agency infiltrates Google and Yahoo networks overseas.

In a statement, Google said it was “troubled by allegations of the government intercepting traffic between our data centers, and we are not aware of this activity.”

“We have long been concerned about the possibility of this kind of snooping, which is why we continue to extend encryption across more and more Google services and links,” the company said.

At Yahoo, a spokeswoman said: “We have strict controls in place to protect the security of our data centers, and we have not given access to our data centers to the NSA or to any other government agency.”

Under PRISM, the NSA already gathers huge volumes of online communications records by legally compelling U.S. technology companies, including Yahoo and Google, to turn over any data matching court-approved search terms. That program, which was first disclosed by The Washington Post and the Guardian newspaper, is authorized under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and overseen by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

Intercepting communications overseas has clear advantages for the NSA, with looser restrictions and less oversight. NSA documents about the effort refer directly to “full take,” “bulk access” and “high volume” operations on Yahoo and Google networks. Such large-scale collection of Internet content would be illegal in the United States, but the operations take place overseas, where the NSA is allowed to presume that anyone using a foreign data link is a foreigner.

Outside U.S. territory, statutory restrictions on surveillance seldom apply and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has no jurisdiction. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein has acknowledged that Congress conducts little oversight of intelligence-gathering under the presidential authority of Executive Order 12333 , which defines the basic powers and responsibilities of the intelligence agencies.

John Schindler, a former NSA chief analyst and frequent defender who teaches at the Naval War College, said it was obvious why the agency would prefer to avoid restrictions where it can.

“Look, NSA has platoons of lawyers and their entire job is figuring out how to stay within the law and maximize collection by exploiting every loophole,” he said. “It’s fair to say the rules are less restrictive under Executive Order 12333 than they are under FISA.”

The operation to infiltrate data links exploits a fundamental weakness in systems architecture. To guard against data loss and system slowdowns, Google and Yahoo maintain fortress-like data centers across four continents and connect them with thousands of miles of fiber-optic cable. These globe-spanning networks, representing billions of dollars of investment, are known as “clouds” because data moves seamlessly around them.

In order for the data centers to operate effectively, they synchronize high volumes of information about account holders. Yahoo’s internal network, for example, sometimes transmits entire e-mail archives — years of messages and attachments — from one data center to another.

Tapping the Google and Yahoo clouds allows the NSA to intercept communications in real time and to take “a retrospective look at target activity,” according to one internal NSA document.

In order to obtain free access to data center traffic, the NSA had to circumvent gold standard security measures. Google “goes to great lengths to protect the data and intellectual property in these centers,” according to one of the company’s blog posts, with tightly audited access controls, heat sensitive cameras, round-the-clock guards and biometric verification of identities.

Google and Yahoo also pay for premium data links, designed to be faster, more reliable and more secure. In recent years, each of them is said to have bought or leased thousands of miles of fiber optic cables for their own exclusive use. They had reason to think, insiders said, that their private, internal networks were safe from prying eyes.

In an NSA presentation slide on “Google Cloud Exploitation,” however, a sketch shows where the “Public Internet” meets the internal “Google Cloud” where their data resides. In hand-printed letters, the drawing notes that encryption is “added and removed here!” The artist adds a smiley face, a cheeky celebration of victory over Google security.

Two engineers with close ties to Google exploded in profanity when they saw the drawing. “I hope you publish this,” one of them said.

For the MUSCULAR project, the GCHQ directs all intake into a “buffer” that can hold three to five days of traffic before recycling storage space. From the buffer, custom-built NSA tools unpack and decode the special data formats that the two companies use inside their clouds. Then the data is sent through a series of filters to “select” information the NSA wants and “defeat” what it does not.

PowerPoint slides about the Google cloud, for example, show that the NSA tries to filter out all data from the company’s “Web crawler,” which indexes Internet pages.

According to the briefing documents, prepared by participants in the MUSCULAR project, collection from inside Yahoo and Google has produced important intelligence leads against hostile foreign governments that are specified in the documents.

Last month, long before The Post approached Google to discuss the penetration of its cloud, vice president for security engineering Eric Grosse announced that the company is racing to encrypt the links between its data centers. “It’s an arms race,” he said then. “We see these government agencies as among the most skilled players in this game.”

Yahoo has not announced plans to encrypt its data center links.

Because digital communications and cloud storage do not usually adhere to national boundaries, MUSCULAR and a previously disclosed NSA operation to collect Internet address books have amassed content and metadata on a previously unknown scale from U.S. citizens and residents. Those operations have gone undebated in public or on the floor of Congress because their existence was classified.

The Google and Yahoo operations call attention to an asymmetry in U.S. surveillance law: While Congress has lifted some restrictions on NSA domestic surveillance on the grounds that purely foreign communications sometimes pass over U.S. switches and cables, it has not added restrictions overseas, where American communications or data stores now cross over foreign switches.

“Thirty five years ago, different countries had their own telecommunications infrastructure, so the division between foreign and domestic collection was clear,” Sen. Ron Wyden, a member of the intelligence committee, said in an interview. “Today there’s a global communications infrastructure, so there’s a greater risk of collecting on Americans when the NSA collects overseas.”

It is not clear how much data from Americans is collected, and how much of that is retained. One weekly report on MUSCULAR says the British operators of the site allow the NSA to contribute 100,000 “selectors,” or search terms. That is more than twice the number in use in the PRISM program, but even 100,000 cannot easily account for the millions of records that are said to be sent back to Fort Meade each day.

In 2011, when the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court learned that the NSA was using similar methods to collect and analyze data streams — on a much smaller scale — from cables on U.S. territory, Judge John D. Bates ruled that the program was illegal under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and inconsistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

Soltani is an independent security researcher and consultant.

분류없음2013.10.30 05:42
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Wall Street Journal

U.S. Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying

By

Adam Entous and Siobhan Gorman

Oct. 29, 2013 12:55 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON—Widespread electronic spying that ignited a political firestorm in France and Spain recently was carried out by their own intelligence services and not by the National Security Agency, U.S. officials say.

The phone records collected by the Europeans—in war zones and other areas outside their borders—then were shared with the NSA, U.S. officials said, as part of efforts to help protect American and allied troops and civilians.

The new disclosure upends the version of events as reported in Europe in recent days, and puts a spotlight on the role of European intelligence services that work closely with the NSA, suggesting a greater level of European involvement in global surveillance.

The U.S. has so far been silent about the role of European partners in these collection efforts so as to protect relationships. These efforts are separate, however, from the U.S. spying programs that targeted dozens of foreign leaders, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose phones were tapped for years by the NSA.

The NSA declined to comment, as did the Spanish foreign ministry and a spokesman for the French Embassy in Washington. A spokesman for Spain's intelligence service said: "Spanish law impedes us from talking about our procedures, methods and relationships with other intelligence services."

In recent days, leading newspapers in France and Spain have cited documents provided by the fugitive former NSA contractor Edward Snowden in reports that alleged that the NSA was sweeping up massive quantities of phone records in those countries.

Le Monde said the documents showed that more than 70 million French phone records between early December 2012 and early January 2013 were collected by the NSA, prompting Paris to lodge a protest with the U.S.

In Spain, the El Mundo newspaper reported that it had seen NSA documents that showed the U.S. spy agency had intercepted 60.5 million phone calls in Spain during the same time period.

After publication of the report in Le Monde last week, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said that it contained "inaccurate and misleading information regarding U.S. foreign intelligence activities."

He said the allegation that the NSA collected more than 70 million "recordings of French citizens' telephone data" is false, but he provided no further explanation of what the data in the documents showed.

Officials privately have said the disclosures in the European press put the U.S. in a difficult bind.

The U.S. wants to correct the record about the extent of NSA spying but doing so in this case would require it to expose its allies' intelligence operations, the officials say, which could compromise cooperation in the future as well as ongoing intelligence efforts.

U.S. officials said the Snowden-provided documents had been misinterpreted and actually show phone records that were collected by French and Spanish intelligence agencies, and then shared with the NSA, according to officials briefed on those discussions.

U.S. intelligence officials studied the document published by Le Monde earlier this month and have determined that it wasn't assembled by the NSA.

Rather, the document appears to be a slide that was assembled based on NSA data received from French intelligence, a U.S. official said.

Based on an analysis of the document, the U.S. concluded that the phone records the French had collected were actually from outside of France, and then were shared with the U.S. The data don't show that the French spied on their own people inside France.

U.S. intelligence officials haven't seen the documents cited by El Mundo but the data appear to come from similar information the NSA obtained from Spanish intelligence agencies documenting their collection efforts abroad, officials said.

The U.S. hasn't made public the role of European spy agencies in the collection efforts because of the diplomatic sensitivities of outing partner services, which the NSA relies on for a considerable amount of intelligence.

Public disclosure of European complicity in the collection efforts would likely spark domestic outrage in those countries against their own governments, and could threaten cooperation with the U.S.

U.S. officials said the European collection programs were part of long-standing intelligence sharing arrangements between the U.S. and its closest allies. Officials said the figures may not reflect the entirety of the phone records collected by France and Spain.


New York Times

N.S.A. Head Says European Data Was Collected by Allies

By MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT

Published: October 29, 2013

WASHINGTON — The head of the National Security Agency on Tuesday vigorously challenged recent reports that the United States had been gathering the phone records of millions of Europeans, saying that the records had in fact been turned over by allied spy services.

“This is not information we collected on European citizens,” said the agency’s director, Gen. Keith B. Alexander. “It represents information that we and our NATO allies have collected in defense of our countries and in support of military operations.”

General Alexander said that phone data was generally collected outside Europe.

The Wall Street Journal reported on its website on Tuesday that intelligence services in France and Spain had collected phone records of their citizens and turned them over to the N.S.A. as part of an arrangement to mitigate threats against American and allied troops and civilians.

But General Alexander and James R. Clapper Jr., director of national intelligence, broadly defended the N.S.A.'s practice of spying on foreign leaders. Such espionage, they said, was a basic pillar of American intelligence operations that had gone on for decades.

Both men said the intelligence was invaluable because it provided American leaders with an idea of how other countries planned to act toward the United States.

Such spying was essential, the officials said, because other countries, including allies, spy on the United States. “It is one of the first things I learned in intelligence school in 1963,” Mr. Clapper said. “It’s a fundamental given.”

The two officials defended their operations before the House Intelligence Committee at a time the N.S.A. has come under growing criticsm and calls for a congressional review of the nation’s surveillance efforts. They said members of the intelligence community were also American citizens who were determined to protect American privacy while identifying national security threats.

“To be sure, on occasion we have made mistakes,” Mr. Clapper said, adding that the intelligence agencies would work with Congress to address any concerns.

But the committee chairman, Rep. Mike Rogers, a Michigan Republican, said he was disturbed by the criticisms of the intelligence services, adding that many recent reports — including the ones in Europe about N.S.A. collection there — were inaccurate.

“This is the time for leadership, it is not a time to apologize,” Mr. Rogers said.

The intelligence committee hearing took place as key Congressional Republicans and Democrats expressed misgivings in the wake of a report that the N.S.A. had targeted Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany for surveillance for several years.

Senator Dianne Feinstein, the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and one of the fiercest defenders of American surveillance operations, said Monday that she did “not believe the United States should be collecting phone calls or emails of friendly presidents and prime ministers.”

Ms. Feinstein said her committee would be conducting a “major review” of the intelligence programs.

According to administration and Congressional officials, the White House has told Ms. Feinstein that President Obama is poised to order the N.S.A. to stop eavesdropping on the leaders of American allies. On Tuesday, another supporter of the N.S.A., Speaker John A. Boehner, raised questions about its programs.

“I don’t think there’s any question that there needs to be review, there ought to be review, and it ought to be thorough,” Mr. Boehner said. “We’ve got obligations to the American people to keep them safe. We’ve got obligations to our allies around the world.”

“But having said that, we’ve got to find the right balance here,” he added. “And clearly, there’s — we’re imbalanced as we stand here.”

Shortly before the hearing began, protesters holding pink signs chastised Mr. Clapper and General Alexander, demanding they apologize to Ms. Merkel.

“It’s counterproductive to spy on our own allies, let alone our own citizens,” one of the protesters said. Mr. Rogers had one of the protesters removed a few minutes later.

분류없음2013.06.06 10:24
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The National Security Agency is collecting the telephone records of millions of US customers of Verizon under a top-secret court order, Britain’s Guardian newspaper reported yesterday.

The order was granted by the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court on April 25 and is good until July 19. It requires Verizon — on an “ongoing, daily basis” — to give the NSA information on all telephone calls in its systems, both within the United States and to other countries.

The document shows for the first time that, under the Obama administration, the communication records of millions of US citizens were being collected indiscriminately and in bulk, regardless of whether they were suspected of any wrongdoing.

Verizon spokesman Ed McFadden yesterday said the company had no comment. The White House and the NSA declined to comment.

Under the terms of the order, the phone numbers of both parties on a call are handed over, as is location data, call duration, unique identifiers and the time the call was placed. The contents of the conversation itself are not covered, the Guardian said.